Inventory 4316
Cape · 96 pages · 84 segments · open at the Nationaal Archief ↗
English
put into execution. It is hardly credible that, having been unable to hold out before him when we had the advantage of the ground, were covered by entrenchments, and defended by good batteries, now that we are weakened by our continual losses and have almost no artillery left, we should deem ourselves in a condition to attack and fight, with the slightest prospect of success, an enemy who has become so superior to us. All the sorties or incursions that we might make against the enemy would therefore serve only to weaken us more and more, and while we thus consumed ourselves in vain, he could, without attacking us and without risking the slightest thing, wait for the time when we would come of our own accord to submit to his rule. By falling upon him unexpectedly, I believe one would think twice when it came to putting it into execution. One might then ask whether it would be possible for us to take a step more in keeping with the views and great interests of our enemies: for we would thereby abandon to them not only the town and everything that could be of any use to them, but also the entire countryside, which would be of much greater value to them, since they would draw from it all the provisions they might need, not only to subsist in their new conquest, but also to victual their fleet and send vessels laden with wheat and all kinds of provisions to Inde, which could entirely change the face of things there, all the more so since our possessions and our squadrons would henceforth be completely deprived of this assistance. I know that these reflections have always made the strongest impression upon me, and since everyone regards this colony as the basis of the war in Inde, not only because it is an excellent place of call, but chiefly on account of the abundance of provisions that it supplies, it is above all this latter item that must be disputed with the enemy for as long as possible, especially since he would acquire a decisive superiority over us if he succeeded in making himself master of it. And as we have no good fortress in which we might sustain a siege, and most of the fortifications that we have made up to now, and those that we might yet construct during the wartime, with the exception of the works being built on the coastline and the permanent batteries along the sea, are only temporary and consequently too weak to mount a defense commensurate with the importance of this colony, my opinion would be not to shut ourselves in, and to consider the post established in the Gorge only as a stronghold where one should place only as many troops as will be deemed necessary to be able to stop an enemy. But if he nevertheless persisted in wishing to hold the capital, we could much better await relief from Europe or from Isle de France, being masters of the countryside, than if, after having yielded to him everything he could desire, we had let ourselves be driven into the Gorge to perish there of misery or subsequently serve as a trophy to the victor. Whereas if we have the misfortune to fail and to be unable to stop the enemy, we will always have a free retreat toward the countryside, where we can subsist without fear that the enemy might force us there, and from where we will have cut off communication and provisions, which would render the conquest of the Cap largely useless to him, and would perhaps oblige him, after a stay of a few weeks, to re-embark because he would have missed the main object of his expedition, which is to make himself master of the source of the provisions supplied by this colony, who might come that way to take us in the rear; that if the enemy attempted a landing on our left, or on our right, this side of the Riviere Salée, we ought to oppose it with open force, and that in the event he made his landing elsewhere and we had nothing further to fear from the direction of the Gorge, one might even then completely strip the post of troops in order to reinforce our main army corps; and that without waiting for the enemy to shut us in at the Cap, we must assemble all our forces, both regular military and burgher militias, to go meet him and fight him wherever the ground is advantageous to us, because unless he comes with extraordinary forces, we will have every likelihood in the world of defeating him, since we have real advantages that the enemy does not possess: 1e: to have fresh troops who are neither fatigued nor weakened by a long voyage. 2e: to have cavalry, of which excellent use could be made. 3e: to have, according to all appearances, a field artillery more numerous and better equipped than that of the enemy. 4e: to be in our own country, and consequently to be able to profit from all the resources that it can furnish us; and that by the perfect knowledge that we have of the local situation, we can harass the enemy and set ambushes for him that he will have great difficulty avoiding; that we can consequently promise ourselves the most fortunate success, and that we will be in a position to profit from the victory, if we have the good fortune to achieve it, which is a great advantage that one does not have when one simply confines oneself to defending lines; that in this way we prevent the enemy from being able to cause any devastation in the country, and in the event that he suffers the slightest setback, we reduce him to considering himself very fortunate if he can succeed in re-embarking even a portion of his troops. 933
Dutch transcription
veni a l'éxecution. Iluest querres Croyable, que n'ayant pu tenir devant lui loisque nous avions l'avantage du terrein, que nous étions Couverts par des retranchements et défendus par de bonnes Batteries, maintenant que nous Sommes affoiblis, par nos pertas Continuelles, et n' ayant presque plus d'artillerie, Mous Hous jugions en état d'attaquer et de Combattre, avec la moindre apparence de Sucies, on Ennemi qui nous est devenu Si Superieur, Toutes les sorties ou incursions que nous pourrions faire suvl' Ennemi ne Serviroient donc qu'a nous affoiblié deplusen plus et pendant que nous nous Consumerions ainsy en vain, il pourroit Sans nous attaguee, et sans risquev la moindre chose attende dutems que Mous vinssions nous memes nous ranger sous ses loix. en tombant Suoliu a l'improviste, je crois quelon se raviseroit lorsqu'il en faudroit Ou pourroit done demandee ll'il nous seroit possible de faire vue demarche plus conforme aus vues et aus grands interets de nos Ennemis: Cav nous lau abaud oinerions pavla non seulement la Ville et tout Cequi pouroit leuretre de quelquntilité, mais Encoretoute la Campagne, qui leur Servit d'on prix bien plus grand, puis qu'ilsen tireroient toutes les provisions dont ils pouvrdient avoir besoin; non seulement pour subsister dans leur nouvelle Conquete, mais Encore pour approviandee leur Flotte, et envoyerdes Vaiseaux Chargés de Bled et de toutes sortes de provisions dans l'Inde, cé quiy pouroit faire changer entierement la face des choses, d'autant plus, que nos Possessions et Nos Escadres y servient dovenavant entieremtent dépourues de le secours. Savoice que les Neflections ont tonj ours fait sur moilaplus vive impremon, et puis que tout le Monde regarde Cetle Colonie comme la Base de la Guerre dans l'Inde, non seulement parceque Cest on Excellent Endroit de relache; mais principalement par rapport à l'abondance des virres quelle foumit, C'est cederiner article Surtout quil faut disputer a l'Ennemi auni longtems qu'il est possible, d'autant plus qu'il acquereroit vue superiorité deudée sur nous, s'il parvenoit a s'en rendre Maitre: Et Comme Nous n'avons point de Bonne forteresse dans la quelle Mous puisions Soutenr un Siege et que laplupart des fortifications que Nous avons faites, jus qu'a present, et Celles que Nous pourrions Encore Construre pendant le tems de Guerre, a l'Exception des Ouvrages que lon Batit à la liter elle et aus Batteries permanentes le long de la Mer, ne sons que Panageres, et par consequent trox soibles pour faire vne défente proportionnéé a l'importance de Cette Colonie; mon avis serait de Nepas Nous enfermee et de ne Considerer le poste êt abli dans la Gorge que Comme on Endroit fort, ouil ne faut mettre quantant de Troappes quon Iugera Mecessaire pour pouroir arrêter un Ennemi Mais S'il Sopiniatioit lependant a en vouloi gardee la Capitale, nous pourions be aucoup mieus attendre le secours d'Europe ou de l'Isle de France, étant Maitres de la Campagne, que si, apres lui avoir cedé tout lequ'il pent desiree, Nous Vous êtious laissé acculee dans la Gorge pour ij periv de Misere ou pour servir dans la Suite de Trophée au Vaicquenr. Aulieu quee i nous avons le malhem d'échouer, et de ne pouvoir arreter l'Ennemi, Nous aurons tonjours la retraite libre vers la Campagne, on Nous pourrons Subsister Sans crainte que l'Ennemi nous y puisse forces, et d'oi Mous ourons coupee la Communication et les vivres, lequi lui rendrait la Conquéle du Cap en grande partie imetile, et l'obligeroit peut être apres en Sejour de quelques Semaines a se rembarquer parcequ'il auroit manqué le grand objet de son Expedition qui est de se rendre Maitre de la Sourie des provisions que fownnit cette Colonie. qui viendroit paola pour nous prendre a Dos; quesi l'Enneni tentoit vuedescente a notre gauche, oua notre Droite, en deca dela Riviere Saléé Nous devrions nous y opposer devive force, et quan Cas quil ent fait sa descente ailleurs et que Nous n'eusions plus rien a craindre du Coté de la Gorge, quon pourroit même alois degarnir entierement leposte pour renforcer notre Corps d'armée, et ques aus attendre que l'Ennemi nous ait enfermé au Cap, Nous devons rassembler toutes Nos forces tant militaires que Milices @ourgeoises, pour aller à sa rencontre et le Combattre partous ou le terrein nous sera avantagens parceque s'il ne vient pas avec des forces extraordinaires, nous aurons la plus grande apparance du Monde de le battre puis que Nous avons des Avantages reels que l'Enneminap oint affoiblies 1e: d'avoir des Trouppes fraiches qui nee ont in fatiquees in afflies par un long Voyage. 2e d'avoir de la Cavallerie dont on pourroit faire un Excellent usage 3e: d'avoir Selon toutes les apparences vue artillerie de Campagne plus nombreure et mieus Tournie que Celle de l'Ennemi 4e d'être dans notre propre pais, et parconsequent de pouvoir profiter detoutes les ressources qu'il pent nous foumir; et que pav la Connoisance parfaite que Mous Avons de la Situation, Nous pourous harceller l'Ennemi et lui former des Embuscades qu'il aura Beaucoux de peine à eviter: que nous pourons parconséquent nous promettre le plus heurens succes et que Nous Serons a même de pouvoir profitee de la Victoire, si nous avous le Bonheur de la reneporter, Cequi est on grand avantage, quel on n'a point quand on se borne Simplement a deffendre des liqnes, Que paola Nous Empechons l'Ennemé à ne pouvoir faire aucune devastation dans le lais, et au Cas qu'il recoive le moindre Echec, nous le reduisons à se croire tres heureus, s'il peut parvenur à rembarquer seulement ruepatie de las Troup per 933
English
I believe I have demonstrated up to now that it would be very dangerous, in the present state of affairs, to shut ourselves entirely within our lines, because we would thereby begin by yielding immediately without any necessity to the enemy the principal object that induces him to attempt the conquest of this Colony, and because, having no fortress in a condition to withstand a siege nor capable of holding one quarter of our troops, we would voluntarily expose ourselves not only to losing the entire Colony, but also to becoming prisoners of war in a short time, which would be an irreparable misfortune that we would have to blame upon ourselves, and which would be all the more unpardonable as, in case of misfortune, we have sure means of making an honorable retreat into the interior of the country, and of being able to subsist there. The defensive plan indicated offers us this advantage, and much greater ones still, since it would only be in the direst necessity and in case of misfortune that we would have recourse to this resource; we may consequently flatter ourselves without presumption that, by following the spirit of this system, the enemy will fail in his enterprise against this Colony, and that even supposing him so superior in strength that we cannot stop him, all the fruit he will be able to derive from it will be to make himself master of the town of the Cape, without finding there the necessary provisions, while we shall remain masters of the countryside and consequently of the source of food supplies, etc. Now, as the detached works being constructed at the Citadel are progressing well, and with the laborers requested will probably be finished before the enemy comes to attack us, and as thereby this fortress will be placed in a condition not to be taken by a coup de main—that is to say, the assailant will be obliged to make the demonstrations of a regular siege and to erect siege batteries—I shall propose a second defensive plan, which will offer all the advantages of the first, and will differ from it only in that its object will be to preserve the capital just like the countryside, and that by following it, we shall derive every possible utility from the lines and entrenchments that we have constructed, which will perhaps reconcile the divided opinions, all the more so as it would be a middle ground between the different opinions on the defense of this Colony; but this middle ground could only take place in the event that we had two to three thousand regular infantry and about 400 trained artillerists. As regards the infantry, we have at present roughly the number requested, and it could suffice for the plan I am about to propose; but if the French troops, which currently consist of eleven hundred men, were to leave us, they would have to be replaced as soon as possible by other good troops, since without that, any defense of the town of the Cape becomes chimerical, and we must always come to that, if we wish to defend this Colony with any semblance of success. I beg you, Sir, to forgive me this digression; I return to the second defensive plan. Supposing then that the garrison of this Colony consists of two thousand four to five hundred regular infantry and four hundred artillerists. It takes time to train good gunners, and it is only by dint of exercises and labor that one succeeds in forming subjects who are truly useful, and from whom one can promise oneself the greatest services; it will be here that the artillery will one day have to render the greatest services to the Company, but one will hope for it in vain if its strength is not proportioned to the importance of this place and to the number of pieces of ordnance that will have to be brought into action. It is therefore very astonishing and unfortunate for the true interests of the Company that, despite my representations, it has not yet judged proper to increase the artillerists of the Cape, although the opportunity for it was very favorable. As for our artillery, it is far from being proportioned to the number of pieces of ordnance it would have to serve in case of attack, and it is with the keenest sorrow, Sir, that I believe myself obliged to represent to you once again that the 56 men of whom our Dutch artillery is composed, far from being in a condition to serve the guns entrusted to them, are barely sufficient to distribute the ammunition to the various batteries. This merits the greatest attention, and must strike with astonishment anyone who truly has the preservation of this Colony at heart, since this alone could entirely abort our best-reasoned plans of defense and render useless all the expenses that the Noble Company has made, during the present war, to put this Colony out of reach of insult. One must not delude oneself that because a portion of the European workmen of the Company are passably well trained in the maneuvering of field pieces, and that the rest of these people, as well as some sailors, are tolerably well instructed in serving guns in batteries, never, whatever pains I take, shall I be able to make good gunners of them, since they will always lack the necessary discipline and the genius or love of the profession; they will consequently be able to become at most nothing more than good artillery assistants, and it is only to a regular corps that one will be able to entrust the maintenance of the materials found in the artillery magazines, and everything that requires some confidence.
Dutch transcription
934 Je Crvis avoir demontré jusqu'apresent qu'il seroit tries dangerens dans l'Etatou Sont les choses, de nous enfermer tous dans nos lignes, parceque nous Commenerions pavla à ceder dabord Sans aucune nécessité à l'Ennemi le principal objet qui l'Enguge à tenter la Conquete de Cette Colonie, et que 1'ayant pourt de Forterense en état de souteni un siege ni qui puisse contenur le quart de Nos Troueppes, Nous Nous Exposerions volontairement non seulement à perdre toute la Colonie, mais encore à devemir dans peu prisonniers de Guerre, Cequi Seroit vn malheur irreparable, que Nous aurions à Nous imputer nous niemes, et qui Seroit d'autant plus imp ardonnable qu'en Cas de Malheur nous avons des moyens Jurs de faire me honorable retraite dans l' Interieur des Terres, et d'y pouvoir Subsister. Le Plan de d'effense indiqué nous offie Cet avantage, et de bien plus grandt encore, puis que ce nee erait quedans la derniere necessité et en cas de Malheur que nous aurions recours à Cette ressource, Nous pourons par consequent Nous flatter Sans présomption qu'en suivant l'Espit de ce Sisteme, l Ennenii échouera dans son Entreprise sur Cette Colonie et que même en le Supposant Si Superieur en force, que nous ne puisions l'arréeter, tous le fruit qu'il en pourra retirer sera de se rendre Maitre de la ville du Cap, sausy trouver les provisions necessaires, pendant que Nous resterons Maitres de la Campagne et parconsequent de la Source des vivres &a: Maintenant comme les Ouvrages détachés quel on constauit à la Citadelle avancent beaucoux, que moyennant les Ouvriers demandés, ils seront probablement acherés avant que l'Enneni vienne nous attaquer, et que parla Cette fortereste sera mise dans le Cas à ne pouvoir ête emporté par on Coux de main, C'est à dire que l'aissaillant sera obligé à faire les Demonsbrations d'vne attacque Reguliere, et a éléver des Batteries de Siege, je proposerai un second projet de defense, qui offira tous les Avantages dupremier, et n'en differera qu'en Cequil aura pour objet de Conservey la Capitale tout Comme la Campagne, et qu'en le suivant, On retirera toute lutilité possible des lignes et retranchemens que Nous avons constraits, Cequi conciliera peut-être les sentimens partagés, d'autant plus que ce seroit vn milieu entre les differentes opinions surla défente de Cette Colonie, mais ce milieu ne pourroit avoir lieu qu'au Cas que Nous cussions e 2 à. 3. mille hommes d'Infanterie regléé et environ 400. Artilleurs instruits. Sour lequi regarde l'Infanterie nous en avons aprésent à peupres le nombre demande, et Elle pourioit suffire au projet queje vais proposer, Mais Si les Trouppes francoises qui Consistent actuellement en Ouze cens hommes venoient à Mous quitter, il f'audroit les remplacer le plutot possible par d'autres Connes Trouppes, puis que Je vous prie, Monsieur, de me pardonner Cette dis gesion, je revieus au Secom projet de défente. Suppoté done quela Garnison de Celle Colonie Consitte en deus Mille quatre à Cing Cens hommes d' insfanterie reglée et quatre lens Artillers Ufaut datems pour former de Jons Canoniers et Ce West qu'a fore d'Exeraces et de travail quel'on vient à bout d'en former des sujets veritablement utiles, et dont ou puisse se promettre les plus grands Services; Ce Sera ici que l'Artillene devra rendre vujour les plus grands seuvices à la Compagnie, mais on l'Es pérera a silon ne proportionne sa force à l'importance de Cette place et au nombre des eouches a feu quil faundra faire agie: Hest done bien ésonnant et malheurens pour les veritables interets de la Compe., qu'elle n'a pas encore juge a propos malgré mes representations d'augmenter les Artilleurs du Cap, quoique loccasion en ait lte tres favorable. Sans Cela toute Defense de la Ville du Cax devient chimerique, et qu'il fandra toujours y veni, si lon vent d'efendre Cette Colonie avec quelque appareme de Quant a Notre Artillerie, il s'en faut de beaucour qu'elle soit proportionnéé au nombrede bouches a feu qu'elle devroit servir en Cas d'attacque, et Cestavee laplus vive douleur, Monsieur, queje me crois obligé de vous représentee encore que les 56. hommes dont Notre Artillerie hollandoise est Composéé, bien loin d'être en état de servir les Pieres, qui laur sont Confiées, ne sont qu'â peine Suffisans pour faire la distribution des Munitions aus differentes Battories, Ceci merite laplus grande Attention, et doit frax per d'Etonnement qui conque a Veritablement à Coeu la Conservation de Cette Colonie, puis que ce la Ceul pouvioit entierement faire avorter nos Projets de defense les nieux raisonnés et rendre mutiles toutes les depenses quela Noble Compagnie a fattes, durant la présente querre, pour mettre Cette Colonie hors d'insulte. Il ne faut pas se faire illusion, sur lequrne partie des Ouvriers Européens de la Compagnie sont passablement bien dressés à la manoeurre des pieces de Campagne, et que le reste de cas gens la comme aussi quelques Matelots, sont assez bien instruits à Servie les Pieces en Batteries, jamais quelque peine que je me donne, je ne pourrai parvenir à en faire de Bons Canoniers puis qu'il leur manquera tonjours la Discipline necessaire et le genie on l'amour du metier, ils ne pourront par conséquent devenur tout au plus quede bons Sewans d'artillerie, et Ce Ne sera quan Corps neme quel on powera Confier la manntention des Chades qui se trouvent dans les Magazins d'Artillerie, et tout Cequi exige quelque Confiance. Succes.
English
From all this infantry, two thousand of the most alert men should be chosen, and one hundred of the most robust gunners to operate the field artillery. This corps of regular, chosen troops would form the field army and should be well equipped with tents and everything required to wage field warfare. It should be always ready to march so that, in case the enemy makes his landing beyond our range, such as in Baije Fals, whether at Simons-Baije, Hottentots Hollande, Muysenburg, or elsewhere, it can move with speed wherever necessary. The elite of all the militia cavalry, both from the town and from the countryside, should join this small army. Precaution will have been taken to remove from this cavalry all those who, by reason of age, health, or constitution, etc., could likely not endure the hardships of field warfare, in order to form a company from them to serve in the capital. The remaining 4 to 500 regular infantrymen would compose the garrison of the Citadel, which would be joined by all the militia infantry and those of the Company's servants who, without being military men, would believe themselves able to be of some utility in the defense of the capital. The surplus of the artillery, consisting of 300 men, would serve the cannons that are found on the various batteries along the coast, supposing that after the landing a part of the fleet returned to cannonade the town, as well as in the entrenchments and in the Citadel if the enemy were to lay siege to it; they would be assisted in their service by all the workmen and sailors who could be spared. The engineers with their workmen would likewise be employed in the service of the artillery, and wherever it shall be deemed necessary. The Governor, Commander-in-Chief of all the colony's forces, could reside in the Citadel and would maintain, by reliable means, continuous correspondence with the commander of the troops, who would command the field army. As soon as there is certain news that the main body of the enemy fleet has appeared in Baije Fals or in Hout Bay, and that there is nothing to fear in Table-Baije, he will set out to occupy the camp of [illegible] that was constructed at the beginning of this war, so as to be within range to move suddenly wherever he deems necessary, and where he believes he can stop and attack the enemy army with advantage, either at the moment of its landing or shortly after it has disembarked. I see that these moments are precious for us and that we must try to take advantage of them, because it is probable that one will find the enemy fatigued from the sea, in a certain disorder from all the hindrances inseparable from a landing, and not having their weapons in the best condition. If one could not engage him at that time, or if good reasons prevented it, one would have to wait for him in some place where the terrain was favorable to us, attack him on his march, and take advantage as much as possible of the circumstances; in which the situation and the exact knowledge that the commander of our troops is supposed to have of the area will serve him greatly, and will provide him several times with the opportunity to fight the enemy with advantage before he has arrived in front of the capital. It is not likely that a prudent and experienced enemy, if he sees us maneuver in this manner, will push his advance very far, since he would expose himself to certain ruin by continuing his march and seeking to besiege the capital; for then he would find himself between two fires, communication with the fleet would be cut off, and the means of subsistence would fail him entirely. It is therefore more than probable that, with even a little foresight, he will soon turn back and will not move farther from his fleet than the certainty of his communication with it would allow him. Moreover, if the enemy were so superior in forces and took his measures so well that it was impossible for our army to engage him with a clear advantage, it would only have to observe him, follow him closely, harass him continually, cut off his communication with his fleet, and make his subsistence, if not impossible, at least very difficult. This difficulty would increase as he moved away from his fleet and approached the capital or some other place of interest that he might wish to master beforehand; and the presence of our army would keep perfectly to their duty all those of our people who, through fear or ill will, might want to join the enemy or supply him with the things he would indispensably need.
Dutch transcription
De toute Cette Infanterie il en faudroit choisir deus mille hommes des plus allertes, et Cent Canonniers des plus robustes pour manaurer l' artillerie de Campagne. Ce Corps de trouppes reglées et choisies formerait l'armeé de Camepagne et devroit être bien muni de lentes et detout requi est necessaire pour faire la Guerre de Campaque; Il devroit être toujours pret a Marcher afin quan Casque l'Ennemi fit sa descente hors de notre portéé, Comme dans la Baije Fals, Soit à Simons- Baije, Hottentots Hollande, Muysenburg, oubien ailleurs, il puisse Se porter avee Celerité partout ou il Seroit necestaire. L'Elite de toute la Cavallerie Ce ourgeoise tant de la ville quede la Campagne devroit Sejoindre à Cette petite Armée; M auroit pris la precaution de retires de Cette Cavallerié tous ceus qui par raison d'age, de Sauté oude Constitution &m. nepourroient pas vraisemblablement Soutenu les fatiques de la Guerre de Campagne, pour en former vue Compagnee qui Serviroit daus la Capitale. Les H a 5. Cens hommes d'Infauterée reglee qui resteroient Composeroieut la Garnison de la Citadelle, a la quelle Se joindroit toute l'Infanterie Bourgeoire et ceus des Seriteurs de la Compagnie qui sans etre militaires se croiroient pouroir etie de quelquatilte dansla Defense de la Capitale. Le Surplus de l'Artillerie consistant en 300. hommes, serviroit les Bonchesafer qui se trouvent sur les differentes @ atteries lelong dela Cote, Supposé qu'apres le De barquement vue partie de la flotte revint pour Connoner la ville, de même quan retranchemens et dans la Citadelle, Si l‛'Ennemi en venoit faire le siege, ils Seroient aides dans leu Sorince par tous las Ouviers et Matelots dons on pourroit Disposer. Les Ingenieus avec leurs Ouviers seroient de nieme employjés au servie de l'Artillerie, et partont ou on le jugera necetaire. Monsre. Le Gouverweur Commandant en Chef toutes les forces dela Colonie, pourroit residee dans la Citadelle et extretiendroit par des moyens surs vne Corres poudance suivie avee le Chef des troupes, le quel Commanderoit l'armeéde Campagne, et d'abord quel on aura la Mouvelle Certaine quale Gros de la flotte ennenie auroit fait son apparition dans la Baije Sals, oudaus la Hont Bage, Il u Est pas apparent qu'‛on Ennemi prudent et entendu, s'il nous voit Manoeurrer de Cette Sorte, poussera bien loin sa Pointe, puis qu'il sexposeroit à vue ruine Certaine en Continuant sa marche et en voulant assiégeola Capitale: Cav alors il se trouveroit entre deus feus, la Communication avee La Clotte Seroit interrompue, et les moyens de subsistance lui manqueroient entierement: Il est done plus que vraisemblable, que pour peu qu'il ait de prevoijance, il rebroussera bientos Chemin, et ne c 'éloignera pas plus de Sa Slotte, quela Cortitudre secha Communiation avec elle, nexouvrale pennetre Au reste si l'Ennemi se trouvoit Si Superieur en forces et qu'il put Si bieu ses mesures, qu'il fut impossible a notre armee de l'entainer avee ru avantage deude, Elle n' aurait qu'a l'observer et les invredepres, le harceler Continuellement, lui Coupee la Communication avees a Clotte, et lui rendre la Subsistance, Si non impossible du moins tres difficile; Cette difficulté augmenteroit a mesure qu'il s'eloigneroit dee a Flotte, et qu'il Sapprocheroit de la Capitale, ou de quelqu'autre Eudroit interessant dont il pourroit avoir envie de ce rendre prealablement le Maitre, et la presence de Notre armée contiendroit parfaitemens dans le Devoir tous Ceux des Notres, qui par crainte ou mauvaise volonté voudroient se joindre à l'Ennenii, ou liu Couri les choses dont il auroit indis pens ablement Besoin et que lo ura rien à Craindre dans la Table- Baije, il se mettra enroute pour aller occuper le Camp de Hlattes quel ona construt au Commencement de Cette Guene, afin d'être a portéé de pouvoir Seporter subitement partout enil le jugera necessaire, et ou il Roira pouroir arréter, et attacquer avee avantage l'Armée Ennemie, soit au moment dee a descente, ou peu apres qu'ellee esa de barquee; Je vois que Ces nomens sont precieus pour Nous et qu'il faut tacher d'en profiter, pariequ'il est probable quel on trouvera l'Ennemi fatique dela Mer, dans vu Certain desordre par tous les Embarras inseparables d'on Debarquement, et n'ayant pas les Armes dans le meilleur êtat; que si on n'avoit pule joind re a Cette Epoque, ou quede bonnes raisons l'eussent empéeché, il f'audroit l'attendre dans quelque Endroit ou le terrein nous fut favorable, l' attaquee dans sa Marche, et profiter autant que possible des Circonstances; en quoi la Situation et la connoissance exacte quele Chef de nos Trouppes est supposé avoir du local liu Servira beaucoup, et lin founira plusieurs fois l occasion de combattre l'Enneii avee avantage, avant qu'il soit arrive devant la Capitale.
English
Then we shall have nothing to fear for this colony: since our army of observation will not permit him to expand or to make detachments, the enemy will himself be continually harassed and ravaged, so that he will deem himself fortunate if he is allowed to re-embark. Thereby his expedition will have failed, and you will have the glory, Sir, of having made him fail in his enterprise and of having preserved the important colony that was entrusted to you. I propose nothing that is very difficult to execute: it is certain that, our corps of troops being composed of what is most vigorous and agile in our garrison, which, by the goodness of the climate and by continuous exercises, finds itself in a state of vigor; that furthermore having about four or five hundred well-mounted cavalrymen, who without being perfectly disciplined are nevertheless the most suitable cavalry in the world to disturb and harass an enemy army; it is certain, I say, that this corps of troops, provided it is well led, will never risk anything in closely observing the enemy, will be continually on his heels, and will always be able to appear whenever it pleases, either at the exit of some defile that the enemy must pass, or on his flanks and rear when he marches in the plain. It seems that such an army of observation, having all the advantages that are proper to it and that constitute its essence, such as: 1st: Being in a friendly country, and consequently being able to profit from all the advantages it can provide, and knowing the local terrain perfectly; 2nd: Having cavalry, and field artillery better supplied than one can reasonably assume the enemy to possess; 3rd: Being an elite corps perfectly acclimatized, not being fatigued or exhausted by a long-distance voyage; 4th: Being sure of its provisions and munitions of war, through the good measures that must have been taken; 5th: Having behind it the capital of the country, toward which it can always send its sick and wounded, and from which it can at any moment receive all necessary refreshments and munitions; it seems, I say, that such a corps of troops must be worth at least double an enemy force that will be destitute of all these advantages. I could also speak of the bastard Hottentots at our disposal, who, if they were chosen with discernment from among those who serve our farmers, could also provide a company of 50 or 100 men from whom genuine service could be derived. But as that is of so little... 4th: To keep in duty all those of our people who, through fear or ill will, might wish to stir up trouble or favor the enemy. In a word, these two systems of defense contain all the advantages that one can reasonably desire, and the enumeration of which would exceed the limits proposed in this memorandum. It is up to the commanders charged with the execution of the different parts of our defense to enter into all the necessary details, to take advantage of times, places, and means, and to derive all possible benefits from them. It is certain that we have many means of which the enemy finds himself deprived, such as horses, oxen, wagons, slaves, fresh provisions of every kind, vigorous and acclimatized troops, etc., etc. 3rd: To put us in a position to keep an eye on everything and to provide for important places, such as, for example, Hout Bay, which is for us one of the most interesting locations and which it will be absolutely necessary to fortify and put in a state of defense, if one wishes to have a safe place to station our ships, sheltered from the attempts of the enemy, etc. 1st: To prevent with certainty an enemy from making himself master of the entire colony. 2nd: To prevent him from ruining the country folk and from committing the devastations common to enemy armies. I have not paused to make an enumeration of all the advantages that such a disposition would procure for us, because it is only upon general matters, and not upon the details of defense, that these reflections turn. I shall simply say that these defense plans have the advantage over all those that limit themselves to the defense of the capital, and that it would not be an exaggeration to say that an enemy who, after having been at least 4 months at sea, had landed six thousand men, closely observed by this corps of troops, could never make himself master of this colony; and that if he attempted it and wished to persevere in his design, his entire army would be ruined in less than a fortnight, and it would be with great difficulty that he could re-embark some remnants of it. 30 2
Dutch transcription
Alois nous n'aurons rien à Oraindre pour Celle Colonie: puis que notre Arnée d'Observation nelui permettra pas dec'êtendre in de faire des Detachemens, l'Ennemi Sera lui même continuellement harcellé et désolé, de facon quil Se civira heureus si l'on vent lui permettre de se rembarquer, par la son Expedition sera manquee, et vous auzez la Gloire, Monsieur, de l'avoir fait echouer dans son Entrepuse et d'avoir conservé la Colonie impoitante qui vous a êté Confice. De Nepropose rien de bien-difficile a éxecutev: Il Est Certain que notre Corps d'Arméé étant Composé de lequil y a deplus vigourens et de plus agile dans Notre Garnison, qui pavla bonté du Climat, et parles Exercies continuels Le trouve Elle mênie dans un Etat de vigueur, que deplus ayant environ quatre ou Cing Ceus Cavaliers bien montés, qui sans être parfaitement disciplinés, Sont lependant la Cavallerie du Monde laplus propre à inquiéter et harceller vne Armée ennemie, Il est Certain, dis=je que le Corps de Trouppes, pourpen qu'il soit bien conduit, ne ris quera jamais rien à observer depres l'Ennemi, sera continuellement a ses trousses, et pourra toujours se trouver quand il lui plaira Soit aue debouché de quelque defilé que l‛ Ennemi devra passer, soit sur ses flans et Derrieres lousquil marchera daus la Plaine. A Semble qurne telle Arinéé d'Observation ayant tous les Avantages qui lui sont propres et qui Constituent son Essence Comme 1e: D'être en pais Auii de pouvour par consequent profiter de tous les Avantages qu'il pent fournio, et d'en connoitre parfaitement le Local 2e: D'avour dela Cavallerie, et vue artillerie de Campagne mieus sournie, quon Ne lepent rais onnablement Supposer a l'Ennemi. etant 3e: Ou Corps d'Elite parfaitement acclimaté, ne se trouvant pas fatiqué, ni exténué par vn Voyage de long Cours. 4e: Etant Sure de Ses Subsistances et de ses munitions de Guerre, paoles bonunes Mesures quel on doit avoir prises. 5e: Ayant deriere Elle la Capitale du Pais, vers la quelle Ellepent toufours renvoyer Ses Malades et Blesses, et dont Ellepeus à tout moment recevoir tous les rafraichinemen et Munitions necessaires, Il semble, disje, qu'on tel Corps d'Armée endoit Valois aunoins vn Double d' Ennemis qui Seront destitues detous Ces Avantages De pourrois encore parler des Rottentots batares dout on peit disposer, qui, Sils étoient Moisis avee Discernement parii ceus qui servent nos paysans, pourroient encore fournur vne Compagnie de 50 ou de t00. hommes dont Eu pourroit tirer de Veritables Services: Mais Comme Cela est de si peu 4e De Contenu dans le devou tous Ceus des Notres qui par Trainte on mairaire Volonté voudroient remuer ou favouiser l‛'Ennemi: Eu vui mot ces deus Sistémes de Défense renferment tous les Avantages que l'on peiit raisoun ablament desirei, et dont l'enumération passeroit les Bornes que l'one est propasé dans Ce Memoire: C'Est aus Chefs charges de l'Execution des Differentes parties de Notie defense d'ontrer dans tous les Détails necesaires, de profiter dateins, des lieus et des moyens, et d'en retirev tous les avantages possibles; il Est sur que Mous avous beaucoup de moyens dont l'Ennemi se trouve depourvu, Comme Cheraus, Socufs, Voitures, Eclaves, Provisions fraiches de toute Espece, Trouppes vigoureures et aalimatees &a. &a. 3e: De nous mettre en Etat d'avoir l'oeil a tout et de pourvoir aus Endroits importans, Comme par Exemple, La Houte=Paije, qui est pour Nous vndes Endroits les plus interessants et quil fandra absolument fortifier, et mettre en êtat de defense, Vent-on avoir vu Endroit sur, pour y pauroir placer nos vaisseaus 1e D'Empecher avee Certitade quin Enneni nepuisse se rendre Maitre de toute la Colonie. 2e: De l'empecher de ruiner les Gens dela Campagne, et de faire les devastations ordinaires aus Arméés ennemies. Je ne mesuis pas arrété à faire le Denombrement de tous les Avantages que Nous procureroit vne telle Disposition parceque Ce M'est que sur la Generalié, et Non suvles détails de défense que roulent ces reffections, je dirai Simplement que Ces projets de d'éfense ont l'avantage sur tous ceus qui se boment à la defente dela Capitale. et que cene seroit pas exagérer do dire, quin Enneni qui, apres avoir élé aumoins 4. Mois en Mer, auroit débarqué Six mille hommes, observe depres par le Coys de Trouppas, Nepourroit jamais se rendre Maitre de Cette Colonie, et que e'il le tentoit et voulus perseverer dans sondessein, toute son armée Seroit ruinéé en moins de Luinze jours, et que ce seroit avee bien de lapeine quil pouroit en rembarquer quelques debris. a l'abu des lentatives de l'Ennemi &a: 30 2