Inventory 4316
Cape · 96 pages · 84 segments · open at the Nationaal Archief ↗
English
911. behind the rocks, brushwood, etc. of the valley, the purpose of which would be to fire upon the landing troops who had breached the entrenchments built near the shore. The importance of this post requires keeping a large detachment there until the enemy's final dispositions have been ascertained. 3e: Hout-Daije, situated about one league and a half south of this pass, is an excellent bay for effecting a landing; there is a basin at the bottom of this bay where at least 10. vessels can be sheltered from any attack, which Nature seems to have formed expressly. Since the news of the war, the Dutch government has been attending to defending its entrance against vessels with a battery of 20. pieces of cannon, which has been established on a point of land jutting into the bay and which would close the passage if it were equipped with heavy caliber. This battery in its current state will consist only of 8 ll: pieces taken from the Company's ships currently there, but it would be appropriate to place heavy caliber there, especially at the epaulement of this battery, which would direct fire upon the entrance of the bay. To cut off communication through this important pass, it would be appropriate to establish a battery ½ league from the basin toward the interior on the slope of the valley; there are several suitable locations for this site. The effect of this battery would be considerable upon the enemy troops attempting to push through the valley; it would have the double advantage of not being exposed to ship fire like the one established at the entrance of the bay, and of entirely cutting off the most practicable and most critical communication route on this coast, because with it the enemy would be in a position to seize the fort, the town, and all the batteries of the roadstead, as well as to occupy the most important part of the countryside surrounding this colony. It would take 6 or 7. hours for a force to march from this bay to the town of Cap. The road is passable for the transport of field artillery by repairing a few difficult stretches located in the valley. We return once more to the importance of this communication route because it is the most military and most decisive maneuver the enemy could undertake to seize Cap, and consequently the most essential to render ineffective. It is to an intelligent officer that this pass should be entrusted. 4e: Fals Taije appears to be the one the enemy will least attempt because of the bad road running from Simons Baije to Muysenburg, where the mountain range of Cap de Bonne Expérance terminates in this area. From Simons Baije to Muysenburg there are about 3. leagues of sandy road interspersed at intervals with small rocks, but passable for artillery, and bordered on the left by a chain of steep mountains covered in brushwood; there are three or four poor batteries of iron cannon on the roadside intended to cut this communication route. It is proposed to place Hottentots in the brushwood to fire upon the troops attempting to force the pass. It would indeed be terrain well suited for obstruction if it were well defended, but a strong battery would need to be established at Muysenburg and another at Simons Taije; infantry distributed at intervals between these posts would then suffice to render this communication route impassable. From Muijsenburg to the town of Cap, it is nothing more than a level road crossing a fine plain where pleasant settlements are found, increasing in number from Constance to Table-Baije. It takes 7. hours by carriage to make this journey, and a body of troops would take at least 10. without dragging artillery with it. It is worth observing that in calm weather one can approach near Muysenburg with sloops and at the same time reach the far end of the bay; this defile would then be avoided by the troops, and these means of defense would be rendered useless, that is to say in the current state of affairs. But if the post of Muysenberg and that of Simons Baije were fortified, there would no longer be any fear of being overwhelmed, because one would be able to move immediately to wherever the enemy might attempt to land. Under this arrangement, I assume there should always be a good permanent detachment at these two posts. 5. La Baye de Saldaigne, about twenty leagues north of the town of Cap, also offers a landing point to the enemy, but the sandy roads and the orders given by the Dutch government to withdraw immediately all livestock and provisions into the interior at the first appearance of the English squadron would make communication very difficult, and it is not presumable that the enemy would ever attempt this means. No further details are given about this bay, as there was no time to travel there, but it is useful to know the country crossed to reach this bay in order to provide for the means of defense. In all possible cases and given the uncertainty of knowing where the enemy might attempt to make his landing, it is of the greatest importance to guard the five major points indicated above to secure the colony of Cape [illegible]
Dutch transcription
911. deviere les Noches, brouvailles &a. du Vallon, dont l'objet Servit de tireo Savles troupes de debarquement qui auroient forcé les retranchemens construis pres du Rivage L'importance de ceposte exige d'y avoir vu gros détachement jusqu'a Ceque l'on se soit assuré des dernieres dispositions del' Eunemi. 3e: Hout-Daije Situéé environ à vne lieue et demie au sus de ce passage est vne aije excellente poury former un Debarquement, il y a vn Bassin dans le Sond de Cette Paije, ou l'on peut mettre 10. Datimens aunoins à l'abri de toute insulte, quela Nature semble avoir formé Expres. Depuis la nouvelle de la Guerre le Gouvernement hollandois s'oceupe due oin d'en d'effendre l'Entrée aus Vatimens par vue Batterie de 20. pieces de Canon, quona établi sur vuepointe de terre qui avance dans la Baije et qui en fermeroit le pavage Si elle etoit garmie de Gros Calibre. Cette Batterie dans l'Etat actuel ne sera Composéé que de prieces de 8 ll: quon apris des Vaisseaus de la Compagnie qui y sont maintenant, Mais il Conviendroit d'y Mettre det gror Calibre Surtont à l' Exaulement de Cette Batterie, qui donneroit das Seux Suvl Entreé dela Baije. Sour Couperla Communication de ce passage important, il conviendroit d'etablie vne Vattetie a ½ lieue du Passin Vers l'Interianr des lerres suole perchant du Vallon; il y a plusieurs endroits propres à Cet Emplacement L'Effet de Cette Batterie Servit Considerable Suvles Troupes Ennemies qui tentervient de percer par le Vallon, elle auroit le double avantage de ne pas être Soumise aus feus des Vaisseaus comme Celle établie à l'entréé dela aije, et de couper entieremens la Communication laplus praticable et la plut interessante de Cette Cote, parcequ'avec elle l'Ennemi Seroit Maitre de semparee du Foit, de la ville et detoutes les Ce atteries dela Rade, ainsy que d'oceuper la partie de la Campagne laplus importante des luvirons de Il faudroit 6 ou 7. heures a vne trouve pour venu de Cette saije à la Ville du Cap. le chenumn est pratieable pour le transport de l'artillerie de Campagne en raccommodant quelques mauvais pas qui se trouvent dans le Vallon Cette Colonie. On revient encore sur l'importance de Cette Communication parceque C'est la Manoeurre la plus Militaire et laplus deusive quel Ennemi puinse faire pour e empares du Cap, et par courequent la plus interestante a rendres aus Effes Cest liore un officier de lete au quel il Convient de Confier ce passage. 4e: Fals Taije paroit Celui quel' Ennenu tentera le Moins à cauredu Mauvais chemin qui reque depuis Simons Baije jusqu'a Muysenburg ou Setermine la Chaine des Montagnes du Cap de Bonne Expérance daus Daus tous les Cas possibles et danse l' incertitude de lavoir ou l'Ennemi tenteroit de faire son Debarquement, il est dela plus grande Consequence de garder les Cing grands points indiques ci dessus pour mettre la Colonie du Cape S. La Baye de Saldaigne a vne vingtaine de lieues au Nou de la ville du Cap, offre aussi vn point de debarquement à l'Ennemi, mais les chemins sabloueus et les ordres donnés parle Gouvernement hollandois de retirer suole Champtous les Bestiaus et les objets de Subsistance dans l'interieur à la premiere apparition del Escadre Angloise, rendroit la Communication tres difficile, et il n'est pas présumable quel Ennemi tente jamais le Moyen. On nevent pas donner d'autre détail sur lette Jaye n'ayant pas eu letems dessij transporter, Mais il est bon de Connoitre lepais quel on traverse pour R rendre a Cette Baije pour pourvou au Moijende défense Depuis Muijsenburg, jusqu'a la ville du Cap Ce M'est plus quon Chemin uni traversant one Belle plaine ou l'on trouve de jolies habitations dont le Nombre augmente depuis Constance, jusqu'à lable-Baije. On Met 7. heures en voiture pour faire ce Chemin et vue troupe en Mettroit aumoins 10. Sans trainer d'Artillerie dvee Elle H Est Bond'Observer quedans un tems dalme l'onpeat venir avee des chaloupes pres de Muysenburg et en meme tems jusquan bout de la Paije, alois on évitera cedésité aus troupes et ou rendroit ces moyens de d'effenrednutiles; C'estadire dans l'Etat actuel ou sont les Choses. Mais Si le poste de Muysenberg et Celui de Simons Baije étoient fortifies, on n'awwit plus a craindre d'etre forcés, parcequon seroit a même de se porter suvle Champ partout ou l' Ennemi lenteroit de debarquer. Je suppote dans Cette disposition quil devroit toujours avoir a demeure vu Bon detachement dans Ces deus portes. Ce Serois en effet vupais de Chicannes S'il étoit bien d'effendu, mais il sand roit établiu vue forte Batterie a Muysenburg et vne aatre à Simons Taije, de l'Infanterie distribuée par intervalle entre ces postes, suffiroit alors pour rendre Celle Communication imptaticable Cette partie De Simons Baije à Muysenburg il y a environ 3. lieues de chemin Sablonneus et Coupé par Intervalles de pelites Roches, mais praticables pourl'artillerie et boidé Surla Gauche d'vne chaine de Montagnes es carpées et Convert de brouvailles, ily y a trois ou quatre Mauvaises batteries de Canon de fer suole oidduchenin destinées à Couper Cette Communication, On se propose de mettre des hottentots dans les Vrouwailles pour lier suoles trouves qui vondroient forcer. le passage
English
Note. in a state of defense. No mention is made of the small places that are found along the Coast between the five great points just designated; they are of so little importance that with small detachments one could defend them successfully, the Coast being lined with reefs throughout almost its entire extent. According to the result of these Observations, there is no doubt that the Commander of the troops, charged with the defense of this Colony, will have as his principal objective to intercept the Enemy from the Communications designated in the notes, and that by means of Signals placed on the summit of the Mountains he will be informed of the place where the Enemy might assemble his forces to attempt his Landing. One thinks that it would be advisable to march in main Body of the Army upon the point he had chosen, and without giving him the time to form in Battle order, to defeat him in detail, without however stripping the two passages of the Hout Baye, and the one that lies between the Table Mountain and the Lion's Head: for one cannot imagine that an intelligent Enemy would not make every effort to force the two passages. They are so essential for the security of this Operation, that one would have to suppose he entirely ignored the constitution of the country to neglect seizing them before all else. All considerations subsequent to these would be out of place in the Observations; Military positions depend solely upon local circumstances and upon the position of the Enemy. If one had been able to remain in this Colony, one would have joined to these notes a Military reconnaissance of the country, on a sufficiently appreciable scale, to display its constitution and make known in a clearer manner all that has only been sketched. It has been judged proper to give no Nautical details, persuaded that all Sailors know the Charts of Mr. Daprés and his instructions on the Navigation of the East Indies. The roadstead that one would have to defend to oppose a Landing offers an extent of more than 8000 toises, from the Salt River to the Bay of Van Kams; this roadstead is practicable almost everywhere for a landing with more or less difficulty. The Enemy can undertake it on the right, in the Center, on the Left, and threaten all these points at once if he has sufficient forces. The lines constructed on the right to withdraw the... The increase of the Works deemed necessary will be set forth after having shown the insufficiency of those that presently exist. The means employed up to the present to place this Town beyond insult do not appear to be Sufficient. In any Other roadstead, he could only form a precarious Establishment for lack of dwellings in which to place his Sick, and because of the difficulty of procuring fresh provisions and the other items of which his Squadron would necessarily be in need after a crossing of 3 to 4 Months. It is thought that the Enemy will not be able to form any Solid establishment in this Colony as long as he is not Master of the town of the Cape and its roadstead, from which one must conclude that he will make every effort to seize it, and thereby assure himself of the Conquest of the rest of the Colony. The extent of this Colony does not permit dividing one's forces to defend the various Bays where the Enemy might undertake a landing, such as those of Saldanha, of False, and of Hout Baye. It is believed that one should confine oneself to the defense of the town of the Cape, of its roadstead, and of the Bay of Van Kams as the most essential and most important object of this Colony. Memoir on the defense of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. 912.
Dutch transcription
Nota. en êtat de defense. En neparle pas des pelits Endioits qui se trouvent le long de la Cote entre les Cing grandt points quel on vient de designer, ils sont de si perd importance, qu'avec de petits détachemens on les défenderoit avec succes la Cote étant bordee de recifs dans presque tout son developpement. Dapres le resultat de Ces Observations on ne doute pas quale Commandant des troupes, chargé dela defense de Cette Colonie nait pour objet principal d'intercepter à l'Ennemi les Communications designées dans les notes, et que par des Signaus placés sur le sommet des Montagnes il ne se fasse instruure du lieu ou l'Ennemi rassembleroit ses forces pour tenter sosz Debarquement. Ou peure qu'il conviendroit de se porter en Corps d'Arméé Suolepoint quil auroit choisi et Sans lui donneo le tems de se former en Tatuille, le battre en d'étail, sans toutes sois degarnir les deus passages de la Rout Gaije, et Celui qui est entre la Montagne dela Sable et la Ecte du Lion: Cavon ne peut pas l'imnaginer qu'on Ennemi nut elligent ne faste tous ses Efforts pour forcer les deus passages. ils sont si essentiels pourla Sureté de Cette Operation, quil faudroit supposer quil iquorat entierement la Constitution du pais pour negliger dee en emparer avans toat Toutes Ces Considerations ulterieures à Celles ci Servient deplacees dans les Observations, les positions Militaires dependent vuiquement des Ciriconstances locales et dela pasition del Ennemi. Silon avoit pu rester dans Cette Colonie on auroit joint a les sotes vne recermoissance Militaire da paijs, sur vne proportion assez sensible, pour en develox per la Constitution et faire Connoitre d'vne maniere plus lumineuse tout lequel'on a fait que décure. Majugé a propes de nedonner aucun détail Nantique, persuade que tous les Marins connoissent les Cartes de Mr. Daprés et ses instructions sur La Marigation des Indes Dientales./. La rade quel on auroit a d'effettre pouwe oppose van Debarquement offre on Developpement de plus de 8000. loises, depuis la Riviere Salée, jusqu'a la Paye de Van Kams, Cetterade est praticable pres que partont pour vu debarquement avec plus ou Moirs de difficelle. L'Ennemi pent l'Entreprendre pacladroite, par le Centre, pavla Gauche et menacer tous ces points ensemble s'il a des forces suffisantes. Les liques construtes à la dioite pour y retirer les L‛on developpera l'augmentation des Ouvrages que l'on juge necessaires apres avoir fatt voi l'insuffisance de Eeus qui existent actuellement Les moyens que l'on a employés, jusqu'â present pour Mettre Colle Ville à l'abri d' insulte, ne paroissent pas Steffisans. Dans toute Autre rade, il ne pourroit former qu'on Etablissement précaire pavle d'efaus d'habitation poury retirer ses Malades et pav la difficallé dese procurer des vivres frais et les autres objets dont son Escadre auroit nécessaitement besoin apres vne traverséé de =3. a. 4. Mois L'on pense que l'Enneni nepoura formee aucun Etablissement Solide daus Cette Colonie tant qu'il nesera pas Maitre de la ville du Cap et de sa rade, d'ou lon doit conclure qu'il fera tous ses Efforts pour s'en emparer, Et s'assurer pavla de la Conquite du reste de LEendue de Cette Colonie nepermiet pas de diviser ses sorcee pour d'effendre les differentes @ayes ou l' Ennemi pourroit entreprendre vu debarquement telles que Celles de Saldanha, de False et de Hout Baye. l'ou croit devoir se borner a la d'effense de la ville du Cap, de sa rade, et de la Baye de Van Kams Comme lobjet le plus essentiel et leplus interestant de Cette Eolome. Memoire sur la deffense dela Colonie du Cap de Bonne Espéiaence la Colonie. 912.
English
troops, in the event that the enemy should succeed in his landing, would not be able to put up a long resistance in their present state. These lines can be raked by fire from behind by the vessels of the roadstead; they could also be turned from their right. They have neither palisades nor covered ways, and their relief is too weak to resist the enemy's cannon for long. They have the further disadvantage of being separated by 2000 toises from the left lines, a distance too considerable for the troops assigned to the guard of these lines to assist and mutually protect one another. It is thought that to ensure a victorious defense, it is advisable to unite one's forces and occupy a position that offers a more concentrated defense. To turn the works already built to advantage, it is proper to continue the right line (4) up to the House of Munick (), to occupy plateau E which is on the slope of Devil's Mountain, and to establish there a good redoubt capable of holding 100 men with 4 heavy-caliber cannon pieces, such as it is designated on the plan. This redoubt will have the advantage of protecting the line, raking its approaches from behind, and making it more formidable. In the event that this line were forced, it would also defend the approaches to the Fort and take in the rear everything that advanced forward. A redoubt of 9 cannon pieces would likewise be needed on the Quarry Plateau E ahead of the left lines (17) to defend its approaches. The small plateau that terminates the left of these lines requires that a battery of 6 cannon pieces be placed there. This redoubt and this battery cover all the terrain ahead of the line and flank it perfectly, as can be judged by the plan. Although the enemy might make his landing by the left as well as by the right, greater attention must nevertheless be given to the defense of the right. The beach there is more practicable; the enemy can even make his landing beyond the Salt River, out of reach of the batteries placed along the coast. He can also land in False Bay or at Hout Bay. In all these cases, he will always be obliged to come attack the right lines and force them in order to become master of the Cape Town. As it must be assumed that the enemy will make every effort to succeed and will employ all necessary means, it is to be presumed that by attacking with artillery he will force these lines at some points, which, as we have already remarked, have neither palisades nor covered ways, and whose relief is very weak. If he manages to force them, there will only remain the Fort or Castle of Good Hope to oppose his success. This Fort, in its present state, will offer little resistance due to its limited capacity and having the same defects as the lines. It therefore becomes very necessary to construct a second line, which will rest upon the Fort and, following the crest of the mountain slope, will terminate, as seen drawn on the plan, at Plateau D, below the redoubt that we have already proposed for the defense of the right. This new line will perfectly defend the approaches to the Fort and make it very formidable. It would be advisable to establish a redoubt H on the plateau below the Lion's Rump with 4 cannon pieces, and to keep an outpost there to observe the enemy's movements and scout his march. It also becomes necessary to make a sort of redan between the two cemeteries (16) to secure flanking fires that can defend the faces of these walls, which are very long and whose base is without defense. If care is taken to tear down the [illegible] of the 913.
Dutch transcription
Troupes dans le Cas ou l'Enneni auroit reussi dans son Debarquement, ne pourroient pas opposer vne lonque resistance dans l'Etat ou Elles sont. Ces liqnes pauvent étre batties de revers parles Vaiseans dela Nade Elles pourroient aussi être tournéés par leur droite, Elles nont ni palissades ni chemins Couverts Et le relief en est trop foible pour resis ter longtems au Canon de l‛Ennemi. Elles ont encore l'Incouvemient d'etre cloiguées de 2000. Coises des Lignes de la Gauche, Distance trop Considerable pour que les troupes destinées a la garde de ces liques puissent se Secourir et se pateger reciproquement. L‛on pense que pour s'assurer d'one deffeuse victorieuse, il Convient de reunir ses forces et d'occuper une position qui offie rue D'effensive plees reservee. Sour tirev avantage des Ouvrages deja faits, il Convient de Continuer la ligne de la droite (4.) jusqu'a la Maison de Munick () d'occupeole Plateau E. qui est sur le penchant de la Montague du Diable, d' y êtablir vue Ponne redonte Capable de Contenir 100. hommes avec. 4. pieces de Canon de gros Calibre Celle qu'elle est d'esignéé Suoles lan Cette redonte aura l'avantage de proteger la lique„ d'en Pattre de revers les approches et de la rendre plus respectable. Dans le Cas ou Cette ligne Sowrit forcee, Elle d'effendroit auni les approches du Fort et prendroit à dos tous lequi se porteroit en avant. Il s'audroit egalement vne redonte de 9. pieces de Canous Suole Plateau de la Carriere E. En avant des liques de la gauche (17) pour en deffeure les approchn Le petit Plateau qui termine la Ganche de les liques exige quelon y place vne Patterie de 6. pieces de Canons, Cette redonte et Cette Battorie embrassent tous le terremn en avant de la ligne et la flanquant parfaiterent ainsy queloupent en jnger pavle Plan„ Quvique l'Ennemi puisse faire son Debarquement pavla Gauche comme pav la droité, L'on doit lapendant donner une attention plus particuliere à la d'éffeuse de la droite. La plage y est plus praticable, l'Ennemi peut meme faire son Debarquement aud ela dela Riviere Salée, hors dela portéé des Batteries placées lelong de la Cote. Il peut ausi debarquee dans la Baye de False ou a hout Jaye; Dans tous Ces Cas il Sera toujours obligé de Venir attaqueer les liques de la dioite et deles forcer pour serendre Maitre dela Ville du Cap. Comme lon doit Supposer que l'Ennemi fera tous ses Efforts pour reussiv et qu'il employera tous les Moyens nécestaires. H est a presumer qu'en Attaquant avec de l'artillerie, il forcera dans quelques points Ceslignes, qui, Comme nous l'avons deja remarque, n'ont ni Palissades in chemins Couverts et dont le relief est bien foible. S'il parvient à les forcer il ne restera plus quele Foit ou Chateau de l'Esperance pour s'opposer à ses succes. Ce Fort dans l'êtat ou il est seradvne foible resistance par soupeu de Capacité et ayant les mêmes defauts que les lignes. Il devient done tres necessaire de faire vne seconde lique qui s'appuyera au Fort Et Suivant l'arrélé du penchant de la Montagne se terminiera Comme on levoit tracé sur le plan, au Plateau D. Audessous de la redonte que Nous wous deja proposéé pour la deffeure dela Droite, Cette nouvelle lique d'effendra parfaisement les Approches du Foit Et le rendra tres respectable, Il Couvriend roit d'tablie vue redonte II, suole Plateau au dessous dela Roupe du Lyon avec 4. pirces de Canons et y avoir un poste pour observerles Mouremens de l'Ennemi et éclairer sa Marche, Il devient encore nécessaire de faire vne lopéce de Redent entre les deus Cimetieres (16) pource procurer des feus de flanes qui puissent d'effendre les faces de les Murs qui sont sou longs et dout le pied est Sans d'effente. Si lon a l'attention d'abattre les Douves des 913.
English
314 sunken roads that are situated in advance of the Fort and by means of which the enemy could advance without being seen. It will be necessary to form a counterscarp with a covered way and glacis facing the front of attack of the Fort or Castle of Good Hope, and to make a batardeau to retain the waters of the stream and prevent them from escaping into the sea. Once this second line is constructed, the defense will be much more concentrated and the forces more united; the right will be only 800 toises distant from the center of the town, and the left 600 toises. The troops at this distance can easily communicate with each other and offer mutual protection. The ridge that lies between Table Mountain and the Lion's Head offers an intermediate post that is very essential to guard; it overlooks the Bay of Camps, where the enemy could execute a landing. This post, which can be regarded as an entrenched camp, must always be occupied by a detachment when news of the enemy is received; it must consist of at least 100 select men. It would be necessary to have some pieces of heavy-caliber cannon there. The greatest attention must be given to this post. It is urgent to establish there as promptly as possible magazines suitable for receiving provisions and munitions of war in abundance. This entrenched camp can be regarded as a secure retreat for all the troops in the event that they should be forced back from the first lines. The enemy could not attack it with artillery; its approaches are difficult, cut by ravines, and the ground can be contested foot by foot. In this position, we will be masters of part of the waters that flow to the town. The Smitz house, marked 28, will form an excellent advance post, where it will be necessary to place 6 pieces of 12-pounder cannon. Nothing will be said of the distribution of the troops, both Dutch and French, to be placed along the coast to charge the enemy at the moment of his landing. The Governor will form the order of battle in the manner that appears to him most advantageous; it will only be observed that it would be advisable to have a considerable reserve at a central point in order to be able to detach a body of troops promptly and bring it to the support of the first ones that have begun to charge the enemy, and to repel him entirely or contest the ground foot by foot if he should be superior. In the event that the troops are repulsed and forced to yield to numbers, they will retire behind the first lines, where they will again await the enemy. They will be able to make a long resistance there, the approaches to these lines being well defended by the redoubts E, C, which we have indicated. It would be necessary to have some bodies of cavalry in the plain behind the dunes. It would be desirable to have sufficient forces to guard Hout Bay and secure this communication, and our vessels would find a safe haven in one or the other of these bays. The redoubt 1 which is proposed for the defense of the Bay of Camps is very necessary; this bay is very important to preserve, not only because the enemy can make a landing there, but also because it offers land communication with Hout Bay in two and a half hours, and this communication ensures the subsistence of the entrenched camp and a connection with the interior of the country. One cannot be turned in force in this position if the ridge of Lion's Mountain is occupied with a detachment of 100 men. Table Bay is sufficiently provided with pieces of cannon to keep the enemy away.
Dutch transcription
314 Chemins creus qui se trouvent en avans du Fort Et à la faveur des quels l'Ennemi pouroit cheminer sans être apercu. Il. Tera necessaire de former vne Contrescarpe avec chemin Couvert et Glacis Rivle front d'attaque du Fort ou Chateaude l'Esperance et de faire vu Datard d'hau pour retenir les laug du Muisseau et les empecher de s'échapper à la Mer. Cette Seconde Ligne Etans Construite la d'effente Se trouvéra beaucoux plus resseréé et les Forces plus reunies, la Droite ne sera éloiguéé du Centre de la ville que de 800. Coises et la Gauche à 600. Coises, les troupes à Cette distance peuvent se Communiquer disement et se proteger reciproquement. Le Nideau qui se trouve entre la Montagne de la Table et la Eéte du Lyon- offie un poste intermnediaie tres Essentiel à garder, il a vue surla Paye de Van Kams ou l'Ennemi pourroit Executor on Debargaen, Ce Poste quel onpeut regarder Comme un Camp retranche doit toujours être occupé pai vn de tachemont lorsquon aura des Nouvelles del Ennemi, il doit être aumoins de 100. hommes de Choip. Il Servit necessaire dy avoir quelques preces de Canous de grot Calibre. L'on doit donner la phes grande attention à le poste. Il Est urgent d'y êtablir leplus promptent. possible des Magazins propres à y recevoir desvivres et des minitions de Guerre en Abondance, Ce Camp retranché peut être regardé Comme vne restiaite assuréé pour toutes les troupes dans le Cas ou Elles Seroient forcées dans les premieres liques. l' Ennani ne pourroit pas l'attaquer avec du Canon, les acces en sont difficiles, Coupés de Navins, et l'oupent lui en disputer le terrein pied a pied, dans Cette Position l'on Sera Maitre d'vne partie des Eaux qui viennent a la ville. La Maison de Smitz Cottee 28. formera va Excellent poste avancé, ou il sera necessaire de placer 6. piees de Canons de 12. lives de Tales; L'on neparlera pas dela Distributiont des troupes tant hollandoises que Francoises à placer le long de la Cote pour charger l'Enneni au moment de Son Debarquement. M. Le Gouverneur formera l'ordre de Bataille de la maniere qui lui paroitra la plus Avantageuse; l'on observera saelement qu'il Conviendroit d'Avoir vne reserve Considerable dans va point Central pour pouvoir détacher promptement vu Corps de troupes et lepoiter au soutien des premieres qui auroient Commencées à charger l'Ennemi et pour le repousser Entiezement ou lui dis puter le lerrein pied-a pied s'il êtoit superieur. Daus le Casou les troupes seroient replices et forcés de ceder au Nombre, Elles se retirerons devriere les premieres liqnes ou Elles attendront de Houveau l'Ennemi. Elles seront a même d'y fatre vne lonque redistance, les approches de ces lignes êtans bien deffendues par les Redontes E. C. que Nous avous indigué. Il Seroit necessaire d'avoir quelques Corps de Cavallerie d'ans la Plaine Devriere les Dunes Il Seroit a desirer que l'on eut des forces saffisantes pour garder la Jaye d' hout et s'assurer Cette Communication, Et Nos vaisseans trouveroiens vn Asile assuréé dans l'une ou l'autre de Ces Bayes, La redonte 1. quel on propose pourla d'effenté dela Paye de Van Kams Est ties nécessaire; Cette Baye est trés importante a Conserver, non seulement parceque l'Ennemi pent y faire vn Debarquement; mais Encore parcequelle offre vue Communication par Eerre avec la aye d'hout En deus heures et demie, Et Cette Communication assure la Subsistance du Camp retranché et vue relation avec l'Interieur des Eerrest. L'on repent pas être towmé in force dans lette portion, en occupant l'arreté de la Montagne du Lyon avec vu Détachement de 100. hommes. La Baye de la Table est Suffisamment garnnie de pieces de Canons pour en éloigner l'Ennemi.
English
to fall upon the enemy at the moment when he might have breached the batteries and advanced upon the lines. The defense system being proposed offers great advantages; one cannot be outflanked in this position, and from whatever side the enemy presents himself to form his attacks, one is ready. The right, the center, and the left can see each other, can communicate, and can protect each other reciprocally; and in the unexpected case that one or the other should be breached, the troops can always fall back upon the entrenched camp, which is a secure retreat where 1200 or 1500 men will be impregnable, if one takes the precaution to supply them abundantly with provisions and munitions of war. Only in the direst extremity will redoubts E, C, and H, which we proposed on the right and left of the defense, be abandoned. These redoubts cannot be outflanked, and with the intermediate post they have well-crossed fields of fire over the town, where the enemy would be greatly harassed if he had seized it. These two redoubts, with a few precautions to be taken, will be able to maintain their communication with the intermediate post and draw their supplies from it. From the redoubt on the right to the town there are 850 toises, from that on the left to the town 600 toises, and from the battery of Smits house to the town 900 toises. These are the means judged to be the most effective, the promptest, and the least expensive for the defense of this colony under the present circumstances. Although the works remaining to be done are still considerable, one must not be discouraged. The importance of this town demands that no possible means be neglected to ensure its preservation. In the event that time and resources do not allow for the execution of the second line in its entirety as proposed, it will be necessary to begin by constructing Redoubt E on the slope of Devil's Mountain, occupying Plateau D where the right of the new entrenchments ends, and constructing Bastions B and C; and the intervals can be occupied by infantry with a few pieces of position artillery. Signed: Bolle, Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding a brigade of engineers. When reduced to occupying the entrenched camp, it would be appropriate to have one or more vessels in some distant roadstead ready to depart at the first signal given to them, in order to inform the Governor of Isle de France of the situation one is in and of the relief that might be needed. To the Baron de Plettenberg, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. Baron, you wish to know the opinion of each of the members you summoned to the Council of War on the defense of the Cape. It is rather difficult to settle on any. Every plan of defense, as of attack, based on knowledge of the terrain, the seasons, the resources, and the forces of the enemy, can contain only generalities, all detail being subordinated to circumstances that vary at every moment. It is up to the sagacity of the man in command to seize those that may be advantageous to him and to profit from them with celerity. It is therefore only on assumed generalities that one wishes now to venture an opinion; I am going to submit mine to you with no other motive than that of complying with the purpose of your request. Is it prudent to risk the defense of the entire colony within the town? It would be necessary to resolve this question beforehand. That is, however, what would happen if all the troops were concentrated there and, unfortunately, they were forced out; for I view a retreat over the heights of the Lion and the Table only as a desperate measure, since it would be necessary to abandon to the enemy everything that could contribute to repelling him. What would troops do on this height without a magazine or artillery? They could not survive there; they would have no other choice to make than to surrender, or to attempt a painful and dangerous retreat via Hout Bay. For that purpose, one would have to assume that the enemy would have made the mistake of not seizing it, which seems difficult to conceive; for one must assume one's enemy has local knowledge, intelligence, and active foresight. Supposing, however, that these troops arrive safely at Hout Bay, one cannot venture to believe that the enemy, master of the town and of all the war materiel you would no longer have, would not seize the moment of this dangerous retreat to strike abruptly.
Dutch transcription
815.. pour soudre suvl' Ennemi au moment ou il auroit= force les Bateries et quil S' avaneroit Suoleslijnen Le Sistemne de D'effense que l'on propose offie de grands avantages; l'on nepent pas êetre towmé daus Cette position Et de quelque Coté que l'Ennemice presente pour former ses attaques, l'on se trouve en mesure: Ladroite, le Centre et la Gauche se voyent, peuvent de Communiquer et de proteger reciproquement et dans le Cas inespéré quel une oul' autre fut forcée, les troupes peuvent toujours Se replier sur le Camp Axtranché qui est vue retiraite assuréé et ou 1200. ou 1500. hommes Seront inexpugnables, si l'on a la precaution de les approvisionner abondament de vires et de Munittons L'on n'abandonnera qu'a la derniere extreuité les redontes E. C. II. que nous avons proposés à la droite et à la Gauche de la deffeuse, Ces redoutes nepeurent point être toumées et Elles ont avecle poste intermediaire des feus bien croises suvla ville ou l'Ennemi Seroit fort inquiété s'il s'en êtoit emparé, Ces deus Redontes avec quelques precautions à prendre pouront avoir leue Communication avee le poste Intermediaire et en retirev leurs besoins. Dela Redoute de la droité a la Ville il y a 850. louses, de Celle de la Gauche à la Ville 600. Coises Et dela Batterie- de la Maison de Smits alaville 900. Voila les mogens quel on juge les plus Efficaces et les plus prompts et les moins Dispendieus pourla d'effense de Cette Colonie dans la Circonstamne presente. Quvique les Ouvrages qui restent a faire Soient encore Considerables, l‛'on nedoit pas se rebuter. l'Impoitance de Cette ville exige quel on ne Neglige aucun des Moyens possibles pour e eurassitees la Conservation Dans le as ou letems et les Moyens ne permettroient pas d'Executer la Seconde ligne (Signé) Bolie, Lieut. Colonel, Commandr. vne Brigade d'Ingenieurs. Loisquon sera reduit à occuper le Camp retranché Il Seroit à propos d'avour ru ou plusieurs @ Patimnens dans quelque rade éloignéé pres a partie au premier signal quon leur feroit pour informerle Gouverneur del'Isle de France de la position ou l'onse trouve et des secours dont en pourroit enentier telle quon la propose, il faudra Commencer par construire la Redoute E. Suole penchant de la Montagne du Diable occuper le Plateau D. ou se termime la droite des Nouveaux Retranchemens, Construre les Bastious B. C. Et les intervalles pourront être occupés parde l'Infanterie avecquelques pieces d'artillerie de position. de Guerre. loises. avoir besoin./ de Plettenberg, Gouverneur du Cap de Monsieur Le Baron Dous desirés connoitré l'iveé de Chacim des Mambres que vous faites Assister du Conseil de Guerre, suvla d'esfense du Cap. Hlost asser difficile de c'arreter à aucune. lout plan de deffense Comme d'attaque, d'apres la Connoissance des lieus, des Saisons, des moyens et des forices de l‛Ennemi, ne pent contenu que des Generalités, tout détail étant subordonné aux Circonstances qui varient a chaque instant, Cost à la Sagaité de l'homme qui Commande, a sainio Celles qui peuvent lai être avantageuses et en profiter avee Celeuté. Ce n'est done que sur des Genéralités supposéés que lon vent maintenant hazarder son opinion, jevais vous soumettre la mienne sans autre motif que celui de d'efirer à l‛Objer de volre Demande. Est il prudent de risquer la deffeuse de toute la Colonie dans la ville ?. Cil Servit necessaire de deud er prealablement Cette question) Cost, Apendant, Eequi arriveroit Si l'on y concentroir toutes les troupes et que Malhaurensement Elles y sussent forcées, Cavje n'eurisage la retraite par la haatens du Lion es de la table que Comme un Moyen désesperé, prusquil fauvrois abandonnera l‛Ennemi tout Cequi pourroit contibuer à le repouser. Que fervient des troupes sur Cette hauteur sans Magazin ni Atillerie ? Elles nexouvroient y sub= =sister; Elles n'auroient d'antre parti à prendre qued ee e rendre, oude tenter vne retraite pemible et dangereure par hout Baye; pour let Effet, il f'audroit Supposer que l'Ennemi auroit fait la faute de nepoint s'en emparer, cequi paroit difficile à Concevoir, Caul on doit supposer à son Ennemi les Connoisances locales, l'Intelligence et l'Active prevoyance, Supposons Eevendant que ces troupes arrivent heurensement à Roud Baye, l'on nepent hazander de Roire que l' Ennenu, Maitre de la ville et detous les Attorails de la Guerre que vous naurier Bonne Esperance. Monsieur Le Baron plus, ne saisise l' instant de Cette retraite dangereuse pouver porter brurquamt. 185. 9 18.
English
more natural to believe that, rebuffed by the obstacles and the local difficulties that he would encounter in his descent on the left, he would move to the right beyond the Riviere Salée; this is the only point remaining to him that would seem to offer him some resources for his subsistence. It is therefore to this side that it is suitable to direct all your means of defense. Consequently, it would be prudent to reconnoiter in advance a post on this side of this river, in range to dispute its passage with him, and to prepare, in the event that the enemy should force it, a retreat into the countryside. It would be equally prudent to agree upon a point to which war and food munitions would be transported, as well as everything that would be necessary for a field hospital, so that recourse might be had to it in case of need. Only 600 men would be designated, with a part of the burghers, who would make their retreat toward the lines for their defense as the enemy gained ground. These 600 men would dispute it with him, while the army that he would find himself having at his rear would harass his rear guard and force him into a double defensive, which would cost him men and weaken him accordingly. In this position, his progress would necessarily be slow; he would be cut off from the resource of being able to communicate with his vessels, and he could no longer rely on reinforcements, which would be all the more necessary to him as the army would prevent him from drawing any from the country. But let us grant that, despite these drawbacks, he should be fortunate enough to seize the lines and finally succeed in lodging himself there; all this requires time, and his successes would not have been so rapid that they cost him nothing. In this state, he will undoubtedly march to make his approaches; then the men who had defended the lines would still dispute the road to the town with the help of the cannon from the citadel. 300 men commanded by a good officer, with provisions, munitions, and enslaved laborers, can hold out for some time in this last post and, in the extreme, take advantage of the position of the army that the enemy would still have at his rear—and consequently have to fear—to obtain a capitulation advantageous for themselves, for the town, and for the troops that had retired between the mountains of the Table and the Lion, if the retreat via Hout Bay had been impracticable for them, whether because of the difficulty of the roads or because the enemy had seized that bay and blocked the passage through it. Can the enemy seize the Cape via the bay with all the means of defense that currently surround it? I do not believe so, and my doubts in this regard are founded on the countless obstacles that he would have to overcome, as much from the fire of the batteries as from the bravery of the troops and the local difficulties. But granting, as a final supposition, that he might succeed, would he hold out in a position that would cut off all manner of communication with the interior of the country for subsistence? Would his troops, after a long crossing, devoid of means and fresh supplies, be in a condition to sustain it for long? And would one not have the resource of attacking him there, of keeping him continually on alert, and the hope of seeing reinforcements arrive from Europe? Can he succeed on the side of False Bay? That is what I am assured, and it is even claimed that he can land there easily. As the position is unknown to me, I will not allow myself any reflections in this regard; they could contain only vague ideas that would indicate nothing positive. It is said to be certain that this route would provide him with communication with the country. That being the case, reinforcements would not be lacking to him; he would march toward the Cape, he would make his approaches with prudence and security, and in this hypothesis, the decision to concentrate your forces there, I repeat, would in my opinion be the most dangerous of all. I shall not dwell any further on the defense system specific to this colony, nor on the possibility or impossibility of an attempt by the English. But from whichever side one views things, and whatever course of action is decided upon, I think, Monsieur le Baron, that you will be sufficiently supported in your operations by the military officers who surround you. As for me, I can only answer to you with a zeal as true as the respectful attachment with which I have the honor to be, Monsieur le Baron, Your most humble and most obedient servant, At the Cape, 24 April 1783. Signed de Meuron 918.
Dutch transcription
plus Naturel de Croire que rebuté parles Obstacles et les difficellés locales quil rencontreroit dans sa descente Surla Gauche, il se porteroit suola dioite aud ela dela Riviere Saléé, Cast les cul point qui lué reste et qui Sembleroit li officir quelques ressoarces pour ses subsistances; C'est doncde le vlé qu'il Convient de tournee tous vos moyens de doffeure. En Consequence il seroit prudent de reconnoitre a l'avance in poste ende ca de Cette Riviere, à portéé deliu en dis puter le Passage, et de former, dans le Cas ou l'Ennemi le forceroit, vne retraite dans la Campagne il Teroit également prudent quon Convint d'en pount ou l'on feroit transporler des d Munitions de Guerre et de bouche ainsy que tout lequi seroit nécessaire a un hopital ambulant, afui quon put y avoir recours au Desoin. On designeroit 600. hommes Seulement avec vue partie de la Jourgeoire qui fervient lear retraite Vers les liques, pour leur deffenre a mesure quel Enneni gaqueroit du Cerrein, Ces 600, hommes lelui disputeroiens, taid is quel'arméé qu'il se trouveroit avour en queué, harcelleroit ses derrieres et l'obligeroit à vue double deffensive qui lui conterois du Monde et l'affoibliroit d'autant. Daus Cette position, ses progres Servient necessairement lents, il se Seroit interdit la ressource de pouvoir Communiquer avec ces Vaiveaus, et il ne pouroit plus Compter sur des secours qui liu servient d'autant plus necessaires quel' arméé l'empecheroit d'en tiree aucun du Pais. Mais admettons que malgré Ces incouvénients, il soit assez heureus pour semparer des liques et qu'Enfiu il parvienne a sy loger, tout Cela demande du lemps, et ses succes N'awirent pas tellement été rapides, qu'ils ne lui euvent rien couté. En Cet Etat, il Merchera saus doute à faire ses approcher, alois les hommes qui auroient d'effendu les liques dis pateroient encorele Chemin de la ville a l'aide die Canon dela Citadelle. 300. hommes command par un Son officier, avec des vires, des Munitions et des Eoclares Manoeuwas peuvent tenir quelque tems dans cedernier poste, et à l'Extrémité, profiter de la position de l' armée que l'Ennemi auroit toujears en queué, et parconséquent à naindre, pour obtenu vne Capitulaliont avantageure pour eux, pour la ville et pourles troupes qui se servient retrées entre les Montagues de la Eable es da Lion, si la Aetraite par hout Taye leur ent ête impraticable, soit pavla difficulle des Chemins soitquel Enneni se fut Emparé de Cette Paye et qu'il en ent otrqué le passage L'Enneni pent il s'emparerdu Cap pavla Baye avectous les Moyens de Elu Cap, le 24. Arril 1783. Monsieur Le Baron Votretres humble & ties Obeisant Servitair De ne m'etenderai point davantage suvlee isteme de desfeure propréa Cette Colonie, ii suvla possibilité oul impossibilité d'na tentative de la part des Anglois, Mais de quelque Coté quon envisage les choses, et à quelque parti quon s'arréte, Je peuse, Monsieuvle Taron, que vous serer suffisament Secondé daus vos operations pavlas Militares qui vous entourent; pour Moi, je nepuis que vous repondre d'on Zele aussi vrai quel attachement respectuens avec le quel Pai l'honneur d 'être d'effense qui l'Environnent actuellement. Je ne le Cois pas, et mes doules a let Egard, sont fondés Suvles Obstadles sans nombre qu'il aurois à Vaincre, lant de la part du feu des B atteries que de la Travoure des Troupes et des difficullés locales; Mais en accordant pour demiere supposition qu'il puine y parvenir, tiendroit-il dans vne position qui lui interdiroit toute Espece de Communication, pour des Subsistances, avee l'Interieur du Pais . Ses troupes, apres vne lonque traverséé, de pourvue de Moyens et de Rafraichivemens, Seroient elles en êtat de la e outenus longtems, et N'auroit-on pas la ressourie de l'y attaquer, de latemi continuellement en halemne, et l'Es poir de Vou arrivar des Aenforts d' Europe Tent il reusir du Coté de la Baye de False . Cest cequon massire, Et l'on pretend meme qu'il pout y debarquer facilement. Comme la position m'est incomme, je ne me permettrai point de reflerions à Cet lgard, ellesne pourroient Coutenus quedes idées Vagues qui n' indiqueroient rien de positif. Il Est dit on Certain que Cette voye lui procureroit vue Communication avee le paijs. Cela posé, les secours ne luu manqueroient pas, il marcheroit versle Cap, il en fervit les approches avec pruedence et secuvilé, et dans Cette hipothese, le parti dy Concentrev vos forces, je le repeté, Seroit Selon moi le plus dangereus de tous. Signé de Meuron 918.
English
Memoir of Colonel de Meuron, of the month of April 1783. No. 6. The Cape is so situated by the great extent of Table Bay, where one can disembark in many places, that in order to defend oneself, one must have many troops and still be very prudent not to spread out too much before having fully penetrated the enemy's true plan of attack, while carefully concealing from him where the troops destined to engage him have been positioned. Camps Bay and Hout Bay are two places of great importance; the former for launching attacks. Note: one must not only be watchful in this Camps Bay over the passage of the gorge and the path from the Society House, but very much so over a footpath that leads higher than the Society House, onto the Lion's neck (the neck on the north-east side of the Lion's Head), for from there a daring enemy could surprise the town; and the second to cut off our last resource (as will be demonstrated below), to make a diversion, and thereby cause confusion. Thus one must keep there a detachment of regular troops with militias. The redoubt agreed to be built in Camps Bay, being so close to the Cape, is of the utmost necessity. There is also a small bay beneath the false Lion's Head, which is better than that of Camps Bay, which must be observed; for if it were known to the enemy, he could form a plan from there to take the entrenchments of Hout Bay from behind. False Bay comes next into consideration, and a redoubt at Muizenberg would be very good; although one has seen, by the manner in which the troops arrived who came during this war from False Bay (who were also fed twice and slept well once on the road; who had Hottentots for a good stretch of the way to carry their knapsacks, many of whom were even on wagons or placed their muskets there), that an attack by troops who must carry everything with them on their backs, and come from so far, and along these roads, is not much to be feared; and that a wise general, who knows true tactics, which do not consist merely in The undersigned has the honour to present the following as his opinion on the defence of the Cape, in the present situation, and on the ultimate resort in the event that one were pushed back and beaten everywhere.
Dutch transcription
Memoire de Monsieur Le Colonel de Meuront, Du Mois d' Avril 1783. No. 6. Le Cap est tellement Situé pav la grande êtendue de la Jaye de Table, ou l‛ou peut debarquer dans bien des Endroits, quel oudoit avoir pour se d'effendre, beaucoup de troupes et encore être bien prudent, de nepas trop s'écarter, avant que lon ait bien peuêtré le Veritable plan d'attacque de l'Ennemi; en liui cachant Soigneasement, ou l'ona plaié les troupes qui doivent le Combattre. La Paye de Van Kamps et la Srout-baye sont deux Endrotts de grande importanne; la premiere pour former des attacques, N: b: lon nedoit pas seulement être attentif dans lette Baye de Van Kamps. Suole passage de la Gorge et du Chenin de la Maison de Societé; Mais beaucoup; suo vu sentier qui mene plus hant que la Maison de Soueté, surle Cou du Lion: Cou au Poté nord est dela léte du Lyon:) Cav dela vn Ennemi Commnt pourroit Surprendre la Ville, et la seconde pour Nous Couper rue derniere ressourie, (omme il va che demontié dans la uite) pour faire vue diversion, et faire pavla Nautre de la Onfusion. Rinsi quelou y doit avoir vu Détachement de troupes reglées avec des Milices. La redonte que lon est Convenu de Construire, dans la Baye de Van Kamps, étant Si préte du Cap, est de la dermiere necessité, Ily a aussi vne petile Baye, sous la faurse tete du lion, qui est meilleure que Cellede Van Kamps; qui doit être observéé, Cav Si Elle étoit comme del' Ennemi, il pourroit formee le plan dce wyzendre, de -la, les retranchemens de Rout-Baaij. Le Paie Fals vient apres en Consideration et une redontte à Muysenburg Servit ties bon quoiquelon avu pavla Maniere dont sont arrivées les troupes qui sont Venues pendant Cette Guerre de la Baye fals Cqui ont encore été deus fois nourries et vne fois bien couchéés en Cemin; qui onteues des hottentols, pendant un bon bout de Chemimn, pour porter leurs sacs dont plusieurs ont même êté Suvdes Chars, ou y ont posé leurs Jusils; guine attacque des trouves qui doivent porter tout avec Eux surle Dos, et Venir dee i loin, et par Ces chemins; n'est pas beaucoup a craindre. et qu'in General Sage, qui Connoit la du Caip, dams la Sitnallon presente, et suo le non plus altra, encas quel bu fut soué et battu partout De Sousigné a l'honneur de donnerle suivant, pour son sentiment surla d'effense Veritable tatique, qui ne Consiste pas seulement, dans 919
English
920. the advantageous positioning of the troops, according to the terrain and the position of his enemy; but just as much to know well and grasp the physical means of what he is going to undertake, and of his soldiers; thus such a General will say to himself, I have troops who have been at sea for a long time; I have a march of ten leagues to make (note: landing at Muysenburg being almost always very dangerous, and often impracticable, otherwise it shortens the path by two and a half leagues). I must pass through very bad roads, which are susceptible to a thousand quibbles and ambushes, I must have my provisions and munitions carried on the back, because the inhabitants will have destroyed everything they could not take away: for this reason there are no beasts of burden, thus I cannot bring cannon, the roads are even so bad, that the most vigorous men would exhaust themselves trying to drag the lightest pieces, and after all that I arrive (supposing that I am not molested on the way) before fortifications (very far from communication with my ships) where I must attack fresh troops. I believe all this well considered, that a wise General will not attack us from that side, and if it were otherwise, that we would have the finest game in the world. The same thing can (approximately) be said of Hout-baye, if it were not for the reasons mentioned above, because there is approximately the same distance and a very bad road, also entrenchments have been made there in the defile. Note. This bay is however in time of war more interesting than False-baye because it can be defended with two batteries, one on the salient point where work has been done, and the other opposite, the bay being there only about 700 toises in width: yet this bay is much more difficult to approach and tortuous than False-baye (note: for this, the latter is better in peacetime) and cannot hold in all safety twenty large ships as some believe, but rather 7 to 8, which we saw with the five ships of the Company, which were restricted there, when there was bad weather, both in relation to the anchorage and the great winds that fall from the mountains, as well as the heavy sea that enters it when there is bad weather at sea. Principally of the number of landings, of the strength of the troops that land, and of the distance of the place where they will land. Because it is certain that when one attacks an enemy at the time he lands, although he is much stronger, the inconveniences and confusion of a landing give us great advantages, which one must not neglect when the true opportunity presents itself. Thus, if an enemy, although much stronger than us, who wished, in order to seize an important post, to land in a single place, and not too far from us; one ought, being covered from the fire of the ships until the moment of the landing, when the enemy The following question is naturally in what manner to act against an enemy in the landing. The undersigned is of the opinion that this must depend on circumstances. For all these reasons one must indeed be persuaded to be attacked in Table Bay, and neighboring places of the Cape, with an attempt to make a diversion at Hout-baye, to give rise to confusion. Also we know that Commodore Johnstone had the intention to attack the Cape, in Table Bay and neighboring environs, even in winter (where the rainstorms are to be feared; but where, on the contrary, it seems, the weather is finer and more constant than in...). One must reasonably suppose that the enemy will land his sick at Robben Eiland, where he will put himself in order to attack us, choosing good moments, and worrying and fatiguing us as much as he can, with false alarms, where the true moment of attack is known to him. For this reason one must, when an enemy is at Robben Island, rest the greater part of the garrison in the houses near the shore, or in places suitable for that in the environs of their posts, to fatigue them as little as possible, putting them however under arms every morning two hours before daybreak, to make them return when one can clearly see all the movements of the enemy, because good landings are generally made at the break of day, having then the entire day to be able to act.
Dutch transcription
920. l'Emplacement avantagens des troupes, suivant le terrein et la position deson Ennemi; mais tout antans à bien Connoitre et saisir les Moyens phisiques de Cequil va entreprendre, et deeas Soldats; Ainsy in tel General se dira, jai des Troupes qui out éte longtemis en Mer; j'ai rucheminde dix lieues a faire (nb: le dibarquement a Muysenburg étant presque toujours tres dangereus, et Souvent impratiquable, autrement cela racourcit le chemin„ de deus lieues et demi) Je dois passer par des tres maiwaiser chemins, qui sont susceptibles de Mille chicanes et Ambuscades, je dois faire poiter mes provisions et Munitions Suole dos, Cavles habitans auront d'etreit tous cequ'ils nont pu emporter: pour Cette raison se a p leo de beles des sommes, ainoy je nepeus pas ammener die Canon, les chemins sont nteme si Maavaises, que les hommes les plus vigoureures s'éstenuroient en voulant trainevles pieces les plus legeres, et apres tous lela J'arrive Supposé queje nesois pas molesté en chemin) devant des fortifications Cbien loin de la Communication de mes Vaissaus) ou je dois attacquer des troupes fraiches. Je Crois tout leci bien pasé, qu'in General Sage ne nous attacquera pas de le Coté-la, et S'il étoit autrement, que nous aurions leplus beaujeudu monde La nieme chose pentêtre (a perpres) dit de Hout bayee, Si Ce N'etoit pouv les raisons nommnées plus haut, Cavil ya axcupres la même distamne et vn tres Mauvaise chemin, aussi ya t'on fait des retranchemens dais le defile. N3 Cette Baye est pourtent en tems de Guerre, plus interestante que Fals Taije parceque lon peut la desendre avec deus Patteries, l'on surla pointe Saillante ou l'on a travallé, et l'Autre vis avis la Caije n'étant la quenviron 700. loises de largeur: pourtant Cette Paie est beaucoux plus diffile à aborder et Portus que False Taije (:nb: pour Cela, Celleci est miellen entens depais.) et nepent pas contenir en toute sureté viugt grandt Vaiveaux Comme quelques vus le roient, mais bien 7 a 8 Ceque sous Avous vu avec sos Cinq Vaisseaus de la Compagnie, qui y étoient genees, lors qu'il faivoit maivan tenis, tant par rapport au mouillage, et des grandes Vents qui tombent des Montagnes, que de la grosse Mer qui yentre lorsquil fait Mauwais tempr en Mer. Princeipalement du Nombre des Debarquemens, de la force des troupes qui debarquent et de l'Eloignement du lieu, ou, ils debarque ront. Cav il est Certain que lorsque l'on attacque un lememi dans le tems ou il debarque, quoiqu'il est beaucoux plus fort, que les inconvenients et la Confision d'un debarquement; nous donnent des grands avantages, que l'on ne doit point negliger lorsque la vraie occasion se présente. Rinsy que si ve rememi quoiqua beaucoux plus fort que Nous, qui voudroit, pour saisir on poste important, de barquer dans un seul Endroit, et pas trop loin de Nous; l'on devoit, étants Convert du Jen des Vaiseaus, jusques au moment du Debarquement, quandl Ennemi La question suivante est Naturellement de quelle Maniere agir contre vn Ennemi dans le Debarquement. Les ousigné est d'opinion que Ce la doit de vendre des Circoustances. Paotoutes ces raisons doit on bien être persuadéés, d'être attacquees dans la Paye de Table, et Endroits Voisins du Cap avee un essay pourfaire one diversion à Hout-baye, pour faire naitre dela Confusion. Aussi Savons Nous que le Commodore John Hous avoit ledessin d'attaquer le Cap, dans la Baye de Table et Cuvirous voisins, neme en hyver Cou les Orages de pluie sont a redonter; Mais ou aucontraire (cela pare) les tems sont plus beaus et plus Constans quedans (dle) loudoit raisonnablement supposer que l' Eimeni de barquera Ses Malades a Robben Eiland, ou il se mettra en ordre pour nous attaquer, en choisistant des bous moments, et en nous inquiettant et faligant tant quil peut, par des fautses allarmes, ou le vrai moment d'attaque lui est Connu Sour Lette raison l'on doit lors qu'‛on Ennenis fut à l'ille Robben, faire reposer la plus grande pattie de la Garnison-daus les Maisons pres du Nivage, ou dans des Cndroits propres à Cela dans les Euvirons de leurs postes, pouvles fatiquer le moins possible, les Mettant pourtant Pous les armes, tous les Matins deus heures avant le Jour, pour les faire rentier, loisque l'onvent Clairentent voir tous les Mouvemens des limenis, Cavles bons debarquemens se fous generalemt. avee la pointe du Pour, ayant alois le jour crtier pour pouevoit agir.
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dare no longer fire on account of his own men; not hesitate, in such a case, to fall upon him with all our forces, to overthrow him before he can form up; but it is also certain that when one goes too far away to attack a landing, one tires oneself out, and one leaves oneself open to being deceived by another landing; that one loses (by exposing oneself to being defeated) the infinite and sure advantages that the distance and the difficult ground which the enemy must cross to reach us provide us; for that puts him out of breath and ruins him completely at the slightest reverse, as will be proved by the article on Algiers. One must also fully expect that the enemy will not make such a mistake, for Commodore Johnstou had planned two attacks, one on the right and the other on the left (as we know from Captain Cristie, who was even to have commanded a division of that attack). The undersigned even believes it very possible and judicious that an enemy who came with very superior forces (as one must suppose in the present case if we are attacked) would try to disperse us and draw us away from the centre, and after a furious cannonade, would come to attack us in the centre, under the advantage of the cannon smoke. NB: especially given the disadvantageous position of the town, which is too close to the left of the citadel, and on the seashore; so that the enemy will try to nestle there. This proves that one must be very prudent, and act according to circumstances, and arrange three signals with flags of a strong colour, which can be seen from afar, accompanied by some rockets, both for the right, the left, and the centre, in order to be able without confusion to bring relief in case of need, upon the signal being made: for if we suppose, in the attack on the centre, our main forces divided, one part at Paarden Eiland, where one can almost be sure of a landing, and the other on the left along the shore, we would make a very great mistake. For although the landing on the left may be more difficult than on the right, it is not at all impossible, and in some places quite easy; for the example of St. Eustatius must always remain in our memory. This depends very much on weather and winds, but one must suppose that the enemy will seize the good moments and will first reconnoitre; one must also believe him well informed on the situation of the coasts in the surroundings of the Cape. NB: These are the reasons that make me fear for our important batteries on the left, not being enclosed like those on the right, but open on all sides. They must be enclosed well, and cannons placed so as to be able to sweep the plain on the left, of which some would be well placed in the angle of the cemetery looking toward the battery 's Heeren Hendriks Kinderen. This also makes me regard the Corderan battery as of the greatest necessity for the left; it would be desirable that there were from this battery a masonry line all along the shore up to the castle. Having considered what has been said, the undersigned believes that the enemy could come in force and in such a manner that he would have landed both on the right and on the left. Then the question is in what manner one should fight him. This question is very important, and one can find difficulties in the situations that one envisions might happen, but one must follow the most natural means that will present themselves on these occasions (our order of battle, to be able to bring mutual relief, being the best that one could adopt), having always as a basis not to engage in decisive combats when the enemy is formed up on the plain and stronger than us; even with equal forces, one must not risk being defeated where one is sure to win when we make use of our position, artillery, and entrenchments; harassing and disturbing him as much as one can (especially with the cavalry) before he arrives there; without moving too far away or dispersing too much, for the natural reasons cited above. The undersigned, persuaded that examples instruct best, will give here that of the landing of the Spaniards under General Oreilli at Algiers, which seems to him somewhat analogous to those that might be made here, to demonstrate that it is not always good to wish to prevent an enemy from landing, and that far from being lost when the landing is made, one gains more by drawing him in when one has fortifications, and when the enemy must 921.
Dutch transcription
nause plus tirer parrappoit à Ses propres Geus; pas hesiter, dans vn tel Cas, de tomber sur lui avec toutes nos forces, pourle Culbuter, avant qu'il vent se formner; Mais il est ainsi Certain queldisque lon s'eloigne trop, pour attacquer un debarquerment, que lon se fattque, et que lon donne prise a êtte Gompe par un autre debarquemt: quel ouverd (en s'exposant d'etre battu) les avantages infinis et surs que la distance et le Mauvais terrein quel ennemi doit franchie pour venir a Nous nous donnent; Cav Cela le met hors d' haleine et le pered tott afait au Moindre Revers, Commneil Seraprouvé par l'article d'Alger. Aussi doit on bien s'attendre que l'rememi Ne fera pount vue telle saute, Cavle Commodore Johnstou avoit prémed ite deux attacques vue à droite et l'autre aganche (comme Mous savons par le Capitaine Cristie, qui auroit même Commandé une division de Cette attacque.) Le Sousigné croit meme ties possible et judicieus, qu‛vn Enneni qui viendroit avec des forces tres superieures comme lon le doit supposer dans le Cas present si Nous Sommes attacques) tacheroit de Mous disperser et Nous eloigner du Entre, et apres una furicure Canonnade, Viendroit nousattacques dans le Centre, sous l'avantage dela sumeé du Canon Nb: Surtout, parla position d'esavantageuse dela ville, la quelle est trox pres dela gauche dela Citavelle; et surle bord dela Mer; ainsy quel Ennemi tachera de Sy nicher. Ceci prouve quel on doit étie bien prudent, et agie Sueivant les Ciiconstances, et arranger trois signaus avecdes pavillous d'rne Couleur forte, que l'ou voit deloin,e accompagnéés de quelques fussées, tant pour la droite que la gauche et le Centre, pour pouvoir sans Confusion se secourir en cas de besoin, au signal fait: Cavsi Nous supposons, dans l'attacque du Centie Not principales forces divisées rue partie a Paarden Eiland, ou l'on peut piesque être sur d'un Debarquement et l'autre sur la gauche le long du Aivage, Mous ferions rneplus grande faute. Cae quoique le Debarquement dela Gauche Soit plus d'ifhile quela droite, il n'est pas dutout impossible, et dans quelques en droits asser faile; Caupi doit, l‛Exemple de St: Custatius Nons rester toujours daus la Memoire. Ceci depend be aucoup dutems et vento, Mais lon doit Supposer que l'Ennemi Saisira les bous Moments et fera premierentent reconnoitre, aussi dott on le civire bien instruit, suvla Sitaation des Cotes aux Eunirons de Cap. Nb: Cls out les raisons qui me fout eraindre pour nos Batteries impoitantes de la gauche n'êtant pas fermées Comme Celles de la droite, mais ouvertes partout C:lon doit les bien fenner, et placer des Canons pour pouvoir balaijer la plaine de la Gauche dont quelques vus seroient bien placees, dans l'angle du Cimettére qui regarde la Batterie 's Heeren Hendriks Kinderen) Cela me fait auss: regarder la baterie de Corderan, de laplus grande - Necessité pour la Gauche, il Seroit a Souhaiter qu'il y cut depuis Cette Baterie, vue ligne en Maconnerie, tout lelong di Rivage jus quarchatear. Ayant considéré cequi a cte dit, le sonsigné eroit, quel Eimenu pouroit venir enforce et de maniere qu'il ent debarqué et sur la droite et suvla Gauche. Alous il s'agit de quelle Mainere on devroit le Combatte. Cette queston est bien importante et lou pert trouver des difficultes, dans les Situations, que l'on Re represente pouvoir arriver, mais l'on doit suivre les plus naturels Moyens, qui s' offierout dans les Occasions: (Notte ordre de Pataille, pour pouvoir se secourie mutuellement, étant la Meilleure, quel on pouroit prendre:) Ayant toujours pour base de nepas engager des Combato decisiss,e lorsque l Rimeni est formé daus la Plaine, et plus fort que ious, même a fories Egales, l'on ne doit pas eisquer d'êere battu, oul on est sur de gagner, loisque Nous faisons usage de Hotre position, artitterie et retranchemens; le harcelant et l'inqiuettant tant que loupent Purtout avec la Cavallerie:) avant quily arrive; Paus Seloigner ous e disperser trop, pour les raisons natureles, alléquées plus hant: Lee ousigné persuadé que les Exemples instruisant le mieus donnera ici Celui du debarquement des Eopaniols Sous le General Oreilli à Alger, qui lui paroit vapeu aualoque à Celles qui pourront se faire iu, pour de monther qu'il n'est pas toujours bon de vouloir empecher on Ennemi de debarquer, et que bien loin d'Etre perdu, loisquele Debarquement est fait, que longagne plues, en l'attorant lorsquel on a des fortifications, et que l' Enneni doit 921.
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922 come from afar, especially from the sea, and when one has difficult terrain to cross. N.B.: in all of this war, where there have been landings so often on both sides, I know of no landing where there was opposition; on the contrary, it was preferred, with advantage, to remain in one's advantageous positions. Count d'Estaing landed at Savannha; they let him do so; he attacked the entrenched English, and he was beaten. Admiral Rodney, with General Vaughan, thought they were sure of taking St. Vincent (they had already announced it in England); they landed there without opposition, but having found the French advantageously posted, they re-embarked without being troubled. The Spaniards, having merely crossed the Mediterranean Sea, presented themselves on the right of Algiers, at about the same distance from the city as Paarde Eiland is from the Cape, in order to make the landing out of cannon range; they landed there in strength, nearly twenty thousand men of their best troops, without a single musket shot being fired at them (the cannon being too far away). The Algerians were on the heights, far out of cannon range of the Spanish vessels. O'Reilly had the precaution to have an entrenchment made immediately, with a few cannons, to cover the re-embarkation in case he did not succeed, and to maintain communication with his vessels in case he had taken possession of the heights a half-league before him (without that, all would have been lost). The General divided his troops into two columns; he attempted to drag a few cannons with him, having landed horses, but they remained in the sand (this coast of Algiers being almost like here, very sandy); the columns advanced toward the heights, where there were some gardens and walls, where the Moors were hidden, who had, much like our peasants, long muskets that shoot from afar; they also aim very well. There was a small advanced redoubt, with only two cannons, on the right of the Spaniards, situated much like our new battery, but farther from the shore. As soon as the Spaniards could be reached by the long muskets of the Algerians, they were greeted with a hail of bullets that killed many of their men, without them being able to kill or see a single Algerian, notwithstanding that they fired very briskly, but their muskets were not as good and too short, and the Algerians were hidden. This, together with the two cannons of the redoubt, had such an effect on the Spaniards that confusion set in and the retreat was made; then the Moorish cavalry came out from where they were hidden, and if they had been as well disciplined as a European cavalry, none of the Spaniards would have regained their vessels (for they attacked the flanks, while the others on foot, who had been hidden behind the hedges and walls, pursued them from the front). Notwithstanding the bravery and good bearing of the Spaniards, especially of the Walloon Guards, who killed and wounded many Algerians, who without attacking in order and march roamed confusedly around them, and that the cannon of the landing entrenchment and the fire of two frigates dispersed them very quickly. This same affair of Algiers has always made me regard our new battery as being of the greatest utility, and to make it stronger it must be well palisaded, and mined as a last resort: that is to say, to blow it up if the situation should become such that we had to take another position, for then it would serve as a great point of communication and reserve for the enemy (one can say roughly the same thing of the intermediate battery); I would also wish, as I have indicated, that we had a strong and large redoubt, which could not be taken without a siege, on the slope near Royebloem where the two roads from the Salt River meet, to secure the heights and flanks on the right while guarding at the same time the entrance to the country; I am still of the opinion, as always, that such a redoubt, connected with the new battery and the height behind Royebloem, which would then be a chain of redoubts (for the enclosure of the house near the new battery and the Royebloem would serve as excellent redoubts and storehouses), would make an attack on the Cape infinitely dangerous for an enemy and would not force us to concentrate directly in the valley of the Tafelberg, where our lines are in case we are repulsed from the heights of Royebloem; this could likewise serve (supposing the enemy had taken the city by the left or the center) to cut off his communication with the country. For these reasons our first position
Dutch transcription
922 venir de loin, Suritout dela Mer, et qu'il a vnterrein difficile à passer. R. b: dans toute Cette Guerre Cou lon a debarqué si souvent depart et d'antre:) il ne mest Comnu aucun Debarquement, on l'one est opposé; aucontraire l'ona préferé avec avantage; de rester dans ses positions avanttageuses. Le Coute d'Estaing a debarqué à Savannha, l'ona laissé faire; il a attacqué las Anglais retranchés, et il aceté battu. L'Adiiral Rodney avec le General Vanghan, se croidient surs, de prendre Sr. Vincent (:ils l'avoient Veja annoncé en Angleterre:) ils sij sont debarqués Sans opposition, mais ayant trouvé les francois avantageusement postés, ils see ont rembarque Sano être incommodés. Les Epagnols ayant seulement passé la Mer mediteranneé Ses out présentés sur ladroite d'alger, a perpres à la meme distance de la ville, que le paarde eiland est du Cap, pour faire le Debarquement hors la portéé du Canon, ils y sout de barqués, Corts, depres de vuigt Willes hommes, de leurs meilleures troupes sans que lou leur a tiré un Coup de Coerroa fitril (:le Canon étant trox loin. ) les Algerieus ét oient Sur les haateurs, loin hors la portéé du Canon des Vaisseaux Es pagnols. Oreilli a eu la precaution de faire directement faire ou retranchement, avec quelques Canons, pour Convrii le rembarquement, en Cas qu'il ne reussit pas, et pour garder la Communication avec ses Vaisseaus, en Cas qu'il ent pris possenion des hanteurs, à vue denie licu devant lui (sans Cela tout 'toit perdie. Le General divisa Ses troupes, suo deus Colonnes, il essaya de trainer quelques Canons avee lice, ayant debarqué des chevaus mais ils resterent dans les able (Cette Cote d'algers, étant presque Comme ic tres Sabloneuse) les Colonnes See out avanceas vers les hauteurs, ou il y avoit quelques Pardins et Murailles, ou les Maures etorient Cachés, qui avoiest à paupres Comme not paysans, des longs fusils, qui tirent de loin; aussi ajurtent ils tres bien. Il sy trouvoit vue velite redonte avancéé, avee deus Canons seulement, sur ladroite des Espagnols; Situéé a peupres Comme notre nouvelle Batorie; Mais plus eloigneé die Rivage. Aunitot que les lopaquols pouvoient être atteints pavles longs furils des Algeriens, l'on leur salua avee vue grele des balles, quileur tua beaucoup de Monde, saus quils pouvoient tuer ou voir un seul algerien, non obtant quils terattent tres vivement, mais leurs Jurils W'etdient pas si bonnes et trop Courtes et les Algeriens etrient Caelies. Ceu avee les deus Canons de la redonte fit tant d'effet Suvles Espaguols quela Confision sy met et que laretraite Sefit alors la Cavallerée Maure, sont sortis douils étrient cachés, et S'ils avoient élé ausi bien disceplinés guine Cavalleie Europeene, aucun des Espagnols auroient raltrapé ses Vaiseans (: Cav ils attaquerent les flanes, pendant que les Aatres à vied, qui avoient été Cachés devriere les haies et Murs, leurs pours uiverent de front:) Non obstant la Bravoure et bonne Contenance des lopagnols, Surtout des Gardes Wallonnes, qui tuerent et blesserent beaucoup d'algerieus qui sans attacquer en ordre et marche rodoient Consusement à l'entour d'Eux et que le Canondu Retranchement de debarquemt. et le feude deus fregattes dis persa bien vite. Cette même affaire d'alger, m'a toujours fatt regarder Notre Houvelle Batterie Comme dela plus grande utilité et pour la rendre plues forte l'on dott la bien pallisader, et Miner pour la deruiere ressouree: C'ost à dire pourla faire Sauter, Si lae itration de vervit telle que House devious prendre vne autra position Cav alors elle serviroit d'on grandt point de Communication, et reserve pour l'Enneni Cloupent dire axeepres la meme chore dela Batterie intermediaire) aum souhaiterois les ourigqué que Nous euvions vneforte et Grande redoute, quel on te pourroit prendre Saus Siege; surla pente pres de Royebloem oules deus Chemins dela Hiviere Salee se vuissent, pour securer les hauteurs et flancs de la droite en gardant en Meme tems l'Entreé du pais, il est lucore d'opinion comme toujours guine telle redonte, avec une liaison avee la Nouvelle Batterie et la hauteur devriere Royebloem qui serdient alors une chaine de redontes, Car l'Encemte de la Maison pres de la nouvelle batterie et le Royebloem, servient des Excellentes redorntes et Magazins:) rendroit à on Ennemi, l'attacque du Eap infiniment dangereuse et ne Mous forceroit pas à Nous Concentrer directemens daus le Vallon, du lafelbey; oue ont nos liques en cas que sous Sommes repoussés de hauteurs de Royebloem, Cela pourroit également Servio (Supposé que l'Ennemi ent pris la ville pavla Gauche oule Centre pourlui Couperla Communication avecle paijs. pour ces Raisons Hotre premiere position
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923. near Rodebloem, deserves much attention in case of attack. The example that the undersigned has just cited and the knowledge that he has of what the soldier is, who comes from the sea into a sandy and difficult country, make him of the opinion that if an enemy makes a landing on Paarden Eiland, one must not march against him with all our forces, not only for the reason that he might make another landing on the left, and perhaps in the center, but because we would lose (by fatiguing our men) the infinite advantages of the bad situation where the enemy must naturally be, which are offered to us when he must attack us on the heights of Rodebloem, where we have our position pieces and the cannon of the new battery. One might say that the enemy will establish himself at Paarden Eiland and will maintain communication with his ships; but if one considers the difficulties, as much from the windy climate of the Cape and the distance from the place where the small vessels can anchor, as from the large swell which is often on our coasts, one will find such an establishment without the slightest danger for us, and perhaps impossible for the enemy. Notwithstanding this, one must, upon the appearance of an enemy, send a good detachment according to the strength of the garrison to Jan Biesjes Kraal near Paarden Eiland, who with some Hottentots and a part of the cavalry of the right (or if the occasion requires it with the entire detachment) will do all the harm to the enemy that they can, both in the landing and when they wish to march against us, harassing him from the rear and flanks, without risking themselves too close; and these will not fall back upon us, but will remain at the back of the enemy, to be able to unite with those people from the countryside who were too far away to come directly upon the alarm signals. They must regard Rondebosch as their rallying post, where in time of war it is very necessary to have ammunition, and even some field pieces. If one considers well all that has been said, one can judge the bad situation and the anxiety of the enemy who, not knowing the forces that harass him from the rear, must march more than half a league through the sand and cross the Salt River to attack fresh men in a position, who have artillery with them, and whom the cannon of the new battery defends, who can also, after having destroyed many enemies, retire behind entrenchments which have a ditch with palisades and several redoubts furnished with cannon, and who (supposing they are forced and driven out of these lines) have for their defense the artillery of Devil's Peak, the Fort of Knokke, the Battery Tulbagh and Charlotte, and after all that the Citadel of the Cape, which if one were to suppose it situated in Flanders is very bad; but situated where it is (even with all its defects which one may well improve, but never perfect) becomes stronger than a regular fortress in Europe, if one has two thousand four hundred regular troops, excluding the militias, as we currently have, though one must nevertheless suppose several killed in the different attacks, but far more of the enemy. For these reasons, the undersigned is of the opinion that one must in such a case leave three or four hundred men in the fort, where it is very necessary to construct within the envelope blindages or casemates, to be able to protect the ammunition and provisions from fire, especially from bombs, and procure a secure rest for half of the garrison, while waging partisan warfare with the rest of our flying army, which is considerable for the African side, falling upon the enemy wherever he might wish to lodge himself to conduct a siege, which, if one observes the hard ground and the other obstacles of this country for an enemy who comes from the sea, would be infinitely painful and would ruin the enemy if it lasted only eight days, or even less, after all that he would have had to suffer in his repeated attacks. One must principally prevent him from seizing the heights, especially the battery that has been constructed on the height of the slope of Devil's Peak, near the house of Munnick, for this battery
Dutch transcription
923. pres de Rodebloem, merite beaucvux d'attention en Cas d'attacque. L'Exemple que le s ousigné vieus de citer et la Connoissance qu'il a de Cequest le soldat, qui vient de la Mer, daus un paijs Sabloneus et difficile, lai fout être d'opinion, quesi on Ennemi fait on Debarquement suw- paarden Cilamd, quel on ne doit pas marcher a liu, avec toutes nos fforces, pas seulement pour raison qu'il pourroit faire in Autre Debarquemant Sula Gauche, et peut être dans le Centre, mais parceque Nous perdions (enfatigant Hote Monde) les Avantages infinis dela manraise situation ou l'Ennemi doit Naturellement être, nous offrent, lorsqu'il nous doit attacquer suvlas Rauteurs de Royebloem, ou nous avons Nos pieces de position et le Canon dela Houvelle Batterie. L'On pourra dire quel' lemeni s'êtablira a paarden eiland. et il tiendra vne Communication avee Ses Vaiseaus; mais si l'on regarde les difficultes. tant pavle Climat Venteus du Cap, et la distance du lieu ou les petits Vaisseaus peuvent ancrer, que de la grande lame, qui est souvent sur nos Cotes lon trouvéra vutel ltablissement sans le moindre danger paurssous, et peut etra impossible pouvl' Ennemi Nonobstans cea, londoit, à l'apparition d'en Ennemi, envoyer en bon Detachement Suivant la force dela Garnison a Jan bresjeo= =Craal pres de paardeneiland qui avec des Lottentot et vue partie dela Cavallerie dela droite; Cousi l'occasion le demande avee l'antier detachement.) Jerout tout le Mala l'Ennemi qu'ils pauvent tant dans le Debarquement que lors qu'ils veulent marcher a Mous, le harcellant a doset flancs, sans se risquer de trop pres; et Ceuxci nee e replieront pas sur Hous, mais resterons a dos de l'Enneni, pour pouroir sunir à Ceus des Gens dela Campagne qui ont êté trop loin pour venur directement Suvles Signaux d'allarmes. Ils. doivent regarder Rondebosje Comme beur poste de ralliement; ou en tems de guerre, il est tres necessaire d'Avoit des Minutions, et meme qualques pieces de Campagne Si lon Considere bien tout lequi a cté dit, l'onpeut juger dela mauvaise Sitnation, et de l'inquiétude de l'Ennemi qui ne connoissant pas les forces qui le harcelent à dos, doit marcher plus d'one denie lieue par lesable, et passer la diviere Saléé pour attacquer des gens Frais, daus vne position; qui ont de l'artillerie avec Eus, et que le Canon dela nouvelle atterie d'effem, qui peevent aussi apres avoir d'étruis beaucoup d'Ennemis, se retirer derriere des retranch= =emens, qui out ou fossé de Palissades et plusieures redontes Jdinnies de Canon, et qui (suppose), forcées et battues hors ces lignes, out pour leu d'effense, l'artillerie de la Montagne du Diable, le Fort de Kestokke, la Patterie Tulbag et Charlotte, et apres tout cela la Citadelle du Cax la quelle si lonla supposeroit, Situeé en flandres, est tres mau= vaise; mais Siruéé ou elle est (même avectous ses defauls quel on vent bien amieliorer; mais jamais la perfectionner,) devient vlus forte quine Fortereste enregle en Europe, si l'on a deus mille quatre Cents hommes de Troupes regléas, honni les Milicas, Comme vous avons actuellement doitt l'on doit pourtant Supposer plusieurs tués dans les differentes attacques Mais beaucoeer plies des Ennenius. Pour Ces Maisons les ousigné est d'opinion quelon doit dans un tel Cas, laiser trois ou quatre Cens hommes dans le sort ou il est tres necessaire de pratiquer dans l‛'Euveloppe; des Blindages ou Casemattes, pour pouvoir garantie les Munitions et vivres du seu, Surtous des Bombes et procurer un repos sur à la Moitie dela Garnison, en faisant la petite Guerre avec lereste de Hotre Annéé volante, la quelle est Considerable pour le Coté d'Affique, en tombant suol Ennemi partout ou il voudroit seloger pour faire on Siege, lequel si l'on observe le terrein dur, et les Autres Obstacles de Ce pais, pour un Eunenii qui vient de la Mer, Seroit infiniment peuible, et ruineroit l'Ennenu, Si Elle duroit Seusement fuit jours, ou moins encore apres tout lequ'il a du souffiir dans ses attacques reiterées. L'ou doit principalement l'empecher de saisir les hauteurs surtout la Batterie que l'on a construct Suvla hauteu de la pente de la Montagne du Diable, pres la Maison de Munnick Cav Cette Batterie
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would entirely dominate the Citadel. If one carefully examines what has been detailed here, one must acknowledge that our current position is very respectable (notwithstanding the great extent of our works, which was necessary due to the location of our mountains; but which hinders the Enemy just as much, whom one can see arriving wherever he wishes to make his attacks); and that the manner of acting against the Enemy that has been detailed in this Memoir is the best, and perhaps the only one that fulfills the important objective of holding the town of the Cape when one has more than two thousand regular troops, besides the Militias. For it is indisputable that one must act differently when one is in the state of weakness in which we were at the beginning of this War, having only Four Hundred regular troops. Common sense dictates that one must not risk shutting oneself up in the Fort at that time, nor allowing the heights of Roodebloem to be cut off. For a small troop that comes to offer some resistance to a large one cannot withdraw as it wishes, because the large one surrounds it (except in a defile); and it would be as cowardly as it is unpardonable to allow oneself to be taken prisoner for nothing, when one has an open country behind oneself, and where one is still sure to receive succour; for the Cape is too important a place in the War of the Indies. For these reasons, one must always have, both in peace and in war, a secure post in the country, where there are storehouses and munitions of war for the last extremity (Stellenbosch is perhaps the best place). However, this must be understood if one is in the state of weakness in which we were at that time. For at present one can and must risk much to hold the town and environs of the Cape, which is and will always be of very great importance, especially when one can, as I shall prove, withdraw (as a last resort) into the country (to join those whom one has left in the Enemy's rear), leaving behind, it is true, everything that cannot be carried on one's back or on horseback; for this, provision must be made in good time (as has been said, by having resources in the country). For the road from the entrenched Cape in the Kloof, planned by the French Engineers, as far as Hout Bay is very practicable for horses, but not for a wagon, and thus not for cannon. And supposing the worst, that the Enemy has blocked this retreat of Hout Bay, there still remain two paths across Table Mountain, of which the most difficult is used every day by the enslaved woodcutters who go there and return with a heavy load on their backs. The undersigned has been there, and although it would be a fatigue for a troop, he answers that they would pass with arms and packs on their backs, although a little work could further improve the path. He does not deny that our situation would be disagreeable, because that assumes we are beaten and forced out of very advantageous posts where there was an opportunity to repel a vastly superior Enemy; but he would very much like to see someone show him a better means of defending the town of the Cape (which is so important) and, if one were beaten, of being able to retreat into the country, if one wishes to employ the resources currently available (as one ought to do) and from which one must expect every possible success. Furthermore, after all, what advantages are not provided by all the gardens towards the Kloof behind the town, which are so many field fortifications from which we can harass the Enemy, and finally the height of the entrenched Camp, which would be inaccessible; but one must have provisions and munitions there. One can keep livestock in the valleys upon Table Mountain, to slaughter them daily. This position would in the end force an Enemy to re-embark, for the men left in his rear will observe him as closely as possible in order to cut off all his means of foraging, and we would support them in case of need, so that they would not dare to move away from the town, assuming everything were taken. Finally, the Garrison of the Castle must (if it could no longer hold out there) try to make a sortie, which could be supported by the flying army upon a signal agreed upon between them; and if that were absolutely impossible, the Commandant will act as he thinks best.
Dutch transcription
924. domineroit tout afait la Citadelle. Si l'on examine bien lequi a éte d'etaillé ia. L'ondoit avouer que Notre position actuelle est tres respectable (non obstant la grande étendice de Nos ouvrages, qui a êté necessaire pavla Situation de Mos montagnes; mais qui gene tout autant l'Ennemi: quel onpent voir arriver partout ou il vent faire ses attacques:) et quela Maniere d'agio Contre l'Ennemi qui a éte d'étailleé dans Cette Memoire, est la meilleure et peut être la seula qui remplit l'objet important, de goeder la ville du Cap lousque lon a plus dedeus mille hommes de Troupes regléés, horni les Milices: Cav il est indis putable que loudoit agie differemment, lors que l'on se trouve dans l'Etat de foiblesse ou nous etions dans le Commenement de Cette Guerre, ayant seulement Quatie Cens hommes de troupes reglées. Le bonsens dicte, quelon ne doit pas risquer alors, de s'enfermer dans le Fort; ni se laisser Couper les hauteurs de Rojebloem: Cav vne petite troupe qui vient faire quelque resistame à rue Grande, Nepent pas se retirer commne Elle Veut, Cavla Grande l'enveloppe (Excepté dans ou desile:) et il servis ausi lache qu'impardonnable, de se laisser prendre presonniers pour rien, ou l'on a vu paijs derriere soi, et oul on est encre sur de recevoir des Secours; Cavle Cap est vu ludwit trox importatt, dans la Guerrede l'Inde pour ces Raisons doit on toujours avoir tant en pais quen querre, in poste sur dans le paijs, ou il y avoit des Magazius et de Munitions de Guerre, pour la derinere neuessité (Hellenbos est peut-être le Meilleuw Endroit. Mais ceci doit être entendu, si l'on est dans l'Etalde foiblesse, ou Mous êtions alous: Cav apresent lonpent et doit hasarder beancoup, pour garder la ville et Euverousdu Cap; Cequi est et sera toujours de tres grande importance, Surtous lorsque lon peut, Comme je le prouverai, s'en aller (endemiere ressourie.) (pour sejoindre a Ceus que l'on a laissé à dos del' Ennemi:) dans le paijs, en laissant, il est vrai, tous leque lon ne pcut pas emporter surle Dos ousue des Chevans deviere soi prour Cela doit on en tenps pourvoir.) Comme il a clé dit d'avour des retources dans le paijs) Cavle Chemin du Cap retranché daus la Gorge, projetté, pavles Ingenieurs Francois, jusques a Rout Bay est tres practicable pour des Chevaus, mais pas pour vn Char, ainsi pas pour du Canon. Et suppote lepire, que l'Enneni ent bouché Cette retraite de Rout- bay, il reste Encore deus chemins, par les Montaques de la Table dout le plus difficile est tous lesjeurs fréquenté, par les negres qui cherchent du bois, qui yront, et reviement avee vue grande Charge surle dos. Les ousiqné y a êté, et quvique se seroit vne fatique pour rue troupe, il repond qu'il y passerois avee armes et Sacks Suvle dos, quoique un a vu Coupourroit encore ammcilleurer le chemin. Ilue desavoue pas, que notre Situation Seroit desagreable, parceque Cela Suppose que Nous sommes battus et forces hors de bieu interestantes Postes, oulon a eu occasion de repousser un Ennemi tres superieur, mais il voudroit bien voi que l'on lui montra vn meillenr moyen pour d'effendre laville du Cap (qui est s'interenante) et que lorsque l'ons eroit battu, de pouvoir se retirer dans le paijs, si lou vent employer les ressouries quelon a actuellement (comme l'ou doit faire) et des quelles londoit attendre tout le succes possible. Cucore quelles avantages ne nous douvent pas aprestont, tous les Tardins, versla Gorge derriere la ville qui sout autant de fortifications de Campagne, d'ou Nous pourons harcelles l' Enneni, et enfin la hauteur da Camp retranché, qui seroit inabordable; Mais l'on y doit avoi des Vivres et Munutions, L'on pent gardes des bestiaus dans les Vallous suo la Montagne de la Table, pour en faire tuer journellement. Cette position forceroit à la fin un Ennemi à se rembarquer, Cavles Geus que l'on lui a laissés à dos, l'observeront d'auni pres ponible, pour lui Coupee tous les Moyens de fourager, et Mous les secourerions en las de besoin de Sorte qu'ils 1'oservient s'éloigner de la Ville, supporé tous pruis. Enfin, la Garnisondu Mateaa, doit, (Ti ellene pourroit sy Soutenur plus longtems:) tacher de faire vue sortie, qui pourroit être Secondeé parl arméé Volante, sue unsignal qui a cté Couvenu entre Eux: lt sicela Nee epouvoit absohement pas, le Commandant agera, Comme il le Croit être pour le mieus.
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No. 9. 325 Memoir on the Cape, by Monsieur the Brigadier de Conway the Cape might be attacked, to transfer the archives and whatever belongs to them to the post that has been proposed inland, where the government must withdraw in case of danger, as the Americans have wisely done, in order to be able from there to issue placards, display sovereignty, and give orders to the military. Then the Cape would be regarded as the advanced post of a country that is truly impregnable. This would also serve to restrain those inhabitants, especially of the town, who, believing all is lost with the town where they have their houses, etc., might think of submitting to the enemy by capitulating for the entire Colony. For although it would be a very great misfortune if the Cape were taken, the undersigned is convinced that the Colony is not lost because of that, and that one can, with decided success, defend the country against anyone whomsoever, if all the measures detailed here are taken in time, and of which the matter is capable. In all cases, it is necessary to keep advice boats in our distant bays. Signed, R: J Gordon Commander of the Dutch Troops At the Cape of Good Hope Manuscript: This Memoir was written in the month of May of the year 1783. N: B: It is of the utmost necessity that as soon as I think that the Cape must be defended to the last extremity, and that every means in our power must be employed to prevent the enemy from seizing it. Without the Cape, it is impossible for the combined forces of France and Holland to carry the war into India, to attack the common enemy there, and to protect the Company's settlements. It is the Cape that not only currently provisions our squadrons and our troops, but also still supplies aid to Ceylon and even to Batavia. We see that since the beginning of the war, the English have obtained, through the Cape Verde Islands and Rio Janeiro, if not abundant provisions, at least sufficient refreshments to reach the island of Anjouan, the Bay of St. Augustin, and even Bombay. Arrived in India, they find on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts and in Bengal, where they dominate, resources that we do not have there. Thus the Cape would be for the English a good additional port of call, which they can nevertheless do without, as they have done up to now. But for France and Holland, it is a necessary entrepôt, an almost unique granary, without which it is impossible to sustain the war in India. It follows from these truths that the most effective means the English could employ to acquire an absolute empire in the Indian Seas would be to seize the Cape. It is known how much this ambitious nation seeks to extend the domain of its commerce, which it would like to make exclusive in Asia by removing every kind of competition. If this nation has made the sacrifice of America by recognizing the independence of the United States, it can be presumed that it will turn its main attention toward its Asian possessions. It is too enlightened regarding its interests not to see that the capture of the Cape would
Dutch transcription
No. 9. 325 Memoire Sur le Cap. de M. le Bugadico de Couway le Cax pourroit être attaque, de transporter les archives, et Cequi en depend, dans leposte, quel on sest proposé, dans le pais ou la kiegeme sedoit rendre en cas dedanger: (Comme les Américains. ont sagement fait Pour pouvoir de la emaner des placares et montrer la Souveraineté, et donner ses ordres au Militaire, alois le Cap Seroit regarde Comme le poste avancé d'‛n paijs qui est reellement imprenable; Cec Serviroit aussi, a Contenu Ceus des habitans, surtont de la ville, qui Croyant tout perdu ava la ville Conils out leurs Maisons Etc:) pourroient penser à se Soumettre aux Ennenus, en Capitulaut pour toute la Colonie. Cau quoique Ces ervit on tres grand Mal Sile Cap fut pris; le s ousigné est persuadé, quela Colonie N'est pas perdue pour Cela, et quel on peut avee vu lucces decidé, garder le paijs, contre qui que ce soit, Si lon prend entemps toutes les mesures quel bna d'etaillées ia, et dout la Chose est Susceptible daus tous les Cas, il est Meuessare, de tenir des Ausos daus Nas bayes eloiqueés. Signé, R: I Gordon Commandant des Troupes Hollandoises Au Cap de bonne Esperance MS: Ce Memoire a clé fait au Mois de Mais del année 1783 N: B: il lot de la doniere Necessité, qu'auvitét que Je pense quil faut defendre le Cap jusqu' à la deriiere Extremité, et Employer tous les moyens qui sont en notre pouvoir „ pour Empécher les Enmenis dee en emparer. Saus le Cap, il est impossible aux sorces Combinees de la France et de la hollande de porter la Guere dans l'Inde, dy attaquee l'Ennemi Commun, et de protegevles Etablis= =sements de la Compagnie: C'Est le Capqui alimente non Seulement, actuellement nos locadres et Nos Trouppes, mais qui fourntt encre des Secours à Ceijlan et menea Batavia. Nous Voyons que depuis le Commencement de la Gueire, les Anglois se sont procurés pavles Isles du Cap Verd et de Rio Saneiro, Sinon des provisions aboudantes, diemoins des Aafraichissemens suffisans pour atteindre l'Isle d'Aijonane, la Paije de St. Augustin et meue Bombaij. Arrives daus l' Inideils trouwent Suoles Cotes de Malabar, de Coromandel et dans le Vengale, ou ils dominens, des ressouries que nous n y avons pas. Binsij le Cap Servit pouvles Anglais vne bonne resa= =che deplies dont ils peuvent lependant se passer, Comme ils lout fait jusquici; Mais pour la France et la Hollande; Cest vu Entrepot necessaire, vn Grenier presque viique, sans lequel il Est impossible de Soutenir la Guerredans l'Inde Olresulte de ces verités que le moyen le plus Efficace que l'Auglais patemployer pour acquerer un Empire absolu daus les Mers des Indes, Ce seroit de s emparer du Cap. Onecait Combien Cette Nation Ambitieute cherche a eendre le Domaine dce on Commerce, qu'elle vonudroit rendre Exclusif dans l'Asie en ccartant toute Espece de Si Cette Nation a fait le s acrifice de l'Amerique en reconmoissant l'Independame des Etatsunis, On pent presumer qu'elle portera son attention principale Juvees Possessions d'Asie: Elle est trop eclairéé sur Ses interêts pour ne pas voir que la prise du Cap liei Concurreme.
English
If peace is not concluded with Holland, there is a very great probability that the first operation of the English will be the attack on the Cape of Good Hope. It will be easy for them to employ there a portion of the veteran troops who have been waging war for seven years in North America. It is therefore of the utmost importance for the preservation of the rest of the Company's possessions to defend the Cape to the last extremity, and to employ to this effect all the means that are in our power. I dare to think further that once the Cape is taken, the Colony is taken. This is what will be judged by the following reflections. Without having the slightest intention of offending the inhabitants of the Cape, one may believe that they are worth neither more nor less than the inhabitants of the other French, English, or Dutch colonies. Now experience has proven that as soon as the enemy has made himself master of the main fortress, of the principal warehouse or outlet of the Colony, the rest of the Colony belongs to him. "Long live the victor" is the general cry of all colonists, whose first wish is to preserve the peaceful possession and enjoyment of their fortunes, no matter under which dominion. The wealth of the inhabitants of the Cape consists principally in their houses and their warehouses. Is it reasonable to demand that the inhabitants, for the most part undisciplined and idle, abandon their wives, their children, their slaves, their houses, and their furniture to go bivouac in the interior and expose themselves to the dangers and fatigues of war? They will do what the inhabitants of other colonies have always done in similar circumstances, what the inhabitants of a poorly fortified town do when it is evacuated upon the approach of a superior enemy: they will remain at home and submit to the law of the strongest. As for the inhabitant of the interior, although his property may be further out of the enemy's reach, he has roughly the same reasons to submit. Indeed, it is natural to think that the English general and admiral charged with attacking the Cape will do what we would have done in their place. They will have calculated that they may succeed in their operation, and that they may also fail. In this uncertainty, they will have taken the precaution of arriving with three or four months of provisions, so as not to be exposed to dying of hunger in the event that the enterprise was not successful. It is also very probable that if, instead of defending oneself with obstinacy and perseverance, one resolves after a weak resistance to abandon the town to retreat into the interior under the specious pretext of preserving the country—it is, I say, very probable... In vain would one flatter oneself with interrupting that communication by a cordon that would be all the more useless and weak the more extended it was. This disposition would expose the troops to being exterminated piecemeal, without fulfilling the intended objective; they would wander from plantation to plantation, be a burden to the inhabitant whose substance they would devour, and would melt away through sickness, fatigue, and desertion. But even if these troops succeeded in disrupting for some time, or even halting the communication between the town and the countryside, what would be the fruit of it? Would one succeed in starving the enemy? That is not likely. A generally accepted maxim is that one must neither fear one's enemy nor despise him. Fear exaggerates the enemy's forces and prevents one from seeing and employing the means one has to resist him; contempt brings about a security and a negligence that are equally fatal. Why does the farmer till his land, cultivate the vine, breed livestock? It is to amass property, to procure comfort for himself and his family. The Cape is the only market where he can sell the fruit of his industry, his wine, his wheat, his livestock, and receive in exchange money, linens, cloths, and other articles that he needs daily. This farmer will not work for nothing; he will continue to sell his commodities to the possessors of the Cape, whether they be English or Dutch. ...would give the key to India, by placing its settlements sheltered from any attempt on our part. 926
Dutch transcription
Sila Paix uest pas concliee avec la Rollande, il y a bies grande Apparence, quela premiere operation des Anglais Sera l'Attacque du Cap de Bonne Coperame: il leu sera facile d'y emploijer vne partie des vicilles Troupes qui fout la Guerre depuis sept Aus dans l'Amerique Septentrionale: il est donc de la derniere importance pour la Conservation du reste des Possessions de la Compagnie, de defendre le Cap jusqua laderniere extremité et d'Employer pour Cet Effet tous les Moyens Jose Cucore penser que le Cap pris, la Colonie est prise, C'est ce dout Out jugera parles reflections suivantes. qui Sont en Hotre pouvoir. Jaus avoir la moindre intention d'offenser les habitans du Cap, il est permis de civire, qu'ils nevalent Ni plies ni moins que les habitans des Autres Colonies francoises, Angloises, ou holland oises. Or l'Experiemce a prouvé quedes quel'Ennemi sest rendu Maitre dela Forteresse principale, die principal Entrepot ou debouché de la Colonie, le reste de la Colonie lui appartient. Vive le Vainqueur est le Crigeneral de tous les Colons, dont le premier Voeu est de conserver la paisible possession et jouissance de leurs foctunes, Nimporte Sous quelle Domination, La Richesse des habitans du Cax consiste princepalement dans leurs Maisons et leurs Magazins: Est il raisonnable d'exiger que les habitans pour la plies part ind ociles et scunéans, ab andonnent leurs femmes, leurs Enfants, leurs Esclaves, leurs Maisons et leurs Meubles pour allee bivouaquer dausles Terreset sexposer aus dangers et aus fatiques de la Guerre ? ils feront Cequont terijours fait les habitans des Autes Colonies en pareelle Circonstance, cequont fait les habitans d'one Ville mal fortifice, qu'on evacue à l'approched' on ennemi supericur, ils resteront chez cus et subiront la loi duplus fort. Quant à l'habitant des lerres, quvique sapropriété Soit plus hors de la portée de l'Ennemi, il a apeupres les memes raisons pour ce Soumettre: en effet Il Est Naturel depenser que le General et l'Amiral Anglois charges d'attacquev le Cap, feront leque Nous aurious faiten leur place: ils auront calculé qu'ilse veuvent reussie dans leur opération, et qu'ils peuvent aus échouer. Dans Cette incertitude ils auront en la precaution d'Arrivee avec trois ou Quatre mois de Virres, afin de nepas être exposés à perir de faim dans le Cas ou l'Entreprise n'eut pas ête heureure. il est aussi bies probable que si aulieu de se defendre avee opinietrete et perseverance, On se resont apres vue foible resistance à abandonner la ville pour Je retirer dans les Terres sous le pretexte Specieux de Conserveole Laijs: il est, disje, tres probable Uvain se flatteroit on d'uiterrompre Celle Comm= =unication pao vue Chaine d'autant plus inutile et plus foible quelle Seroit plus étenduce. Cette disposition exposeroit les Troupes a être exterminees en d'étail, Sans remolir lobjet proposé; elles erreroient d'habitation en habit¬ =atton, Seroiem a charge à l'habitant, dont elle devoreurent la substame, et se Condroient pavles maladies, las fatiques et la désertion. Mais quand neme Cas Trouppes parviendroient a troubler pour quelque tems, à arréter neme la Communication entre la ville et la Camp= =aque, quel en seroit le fruit? Parviendroit-on à affameo l'Ennemi E. Cela n'est pas vraisemblable. Une Maxime generalement recie est, qu'il ne faut ni Craindreson Ennemi in le mépriser, La crainte exagere les forces del'Ennemi, et empéche de voir et d'employer les moyens quon a pour lii resister: le Mepris entraine vne securité et vue negligence egalement siretes. pourquoi le paysan laboure t il Saterre, Cultire t' illa Vigne, nourrit il des Destiaus. C'est pour amasser du Tien, pour se procurer de l' aisance a lui et à Sa Famille Le Cap est le seul marché ou il puisse vendre le fruit de son industrie, son vin, son bled Ses Testiaus, et recevoir en échange de l'argent, des toiles, des drays et autres objets dont ila besoin journellement. Ce paysant ne travaillera pas gratuitement, il continuera à vendre ses devréés aus Possessurs du Cap, soit qu'ils soient anglois on donneroit la Cleff de l'Inde, en mettant ses Etablisse= =ments à l'abi de toute tentative de Notre part. Hollandois. 926
English
927 ...that the first care of the Anglois on entering the town will be to seize all the wheat, flour, biscuit, salt meat, wine, eau de vie, etc., etc. that they will find both in public storehouses and in private homes; it is estimated that they will easily amass provisions for at least six months. Meanwhile, the private inhabitants, who, being abandoned by the troops, will see all that is most precious to them—their own persons, those of their wives, their children, their houses, their furniture and effects, their slaves—in the power of the enemy, will have only two courses of action to take: The first would be to leave behind what is dearest to them, to go and ask for bread from the inhabitants of the countryside, whose distress they would increase as well as that of the troops. The second, and the one they would take according to all appearances, would be to submit to the victor, to support and distribute his manifestos, and to cooperate with all their might to induce the inhabitants of the countryside to accept the advantageous conditions that would be offered to them, and to bring the produce of their lands to the Cap. The country folk, bound by friendship, kinship, and interests to the inhabitants of the town, would be inclined to relieve them, and a very powerful motive to determine them to do so is the certainty of being paid in cash. How could fifteen or eighteen hundred troop men prevent this communication? The coast alone, which extends from the Baije de Saldagne to the Riviere Salée, would be poorly guarded by five or six thousand men. It would also be necessary to guard all the outlets leading into the interior of the country and the bays of False and of Houte. Let one cast an eye upon the map of the country, and let one judge whether it is possible to blockade so vast an expanse with eighteen hundred troop men scattered in small detachments several leagues from one another. Will one prevent the longboats and other craft of the enemy from landing at the different points of the coast and receiving there the provisions that the inhabitants will bring them? Let one consider, moreover, the state of these troops dispersed in squads at great distances, fatigued by continual marches and night watches, and reduced to a precarious subsistence that will have to be wrested from self-interested inhabitants; finally, the colonists, little accustomed to the horrors of war, will seek to put an end to it by joining the enemy to rid themselves of the troops who, far from being of the least utility to them, will be burdensome and odious to them. Much reliance has been placed on the cavalry of the countryside, and I agree that as long as the town is not abandoned, it might render some service; however, one must remember that when the horsemen were assembled at the Cap in Juillet 1781 upon the entry of the Anglois squadron into the Baije de Salvagne, they showed the liveliest impatience to return home, and the greatest number left the Cap despite orders to the contrary. What would happen if the enemy were master of the town? Would they leave their homesteads, their wives, and their children to the mercy of the Blacks, to camp in arid plains—not to drive the enemy from the Cap, but to add to the distress and misery of their relatives and friends left in the town? But finally, supposing that these inhabitants should persist in not supplying provisions to the town, despite the ties of blood, of friendship, and, the most powerful lure, of money; supposing that, forgetting the care of their families and their possessions, they remained with the troops in a position within reach of the town, what would result from it? Would they retake the Cap? Certainly not. Its defense will be much easier for the enemy than it was for us; to be convinced of it, it suffices to cast one's eyes upon the plan; one will see that we are obliged to watch over a great number of points and divide our forces accordingly. The enemy, masters of the roadstead, have nothing to fear on the side of the Baije de Van Camps, nor from the Baije de Van Camps to the Maison de Locéte, nor from that house to the cemetery, nor from the cemetery to the castle, nor finally from the castle to Fort LaKnogue; they can therefore direct all their forces toward the right, without fear of being outflanked, without fear of diversion or false attack. What could...
Dutch transcription
927 que lepremier Soin des Anglois en entrant dans la Ville, Sera de Semparer de tout le Bled, Tarine, Discuit, Salaison, vin, Cau devie &a &a. qu'ils trouverout taut dans les Magazins publies que chez les particuliers, Ou Estune qu'ils amasseront faclement des provisions aumoins pour six mois. Cependant les particuliers qui étant abandonnés parles Troupes Verront tout cequ'ils ont deplus precieus, leurs propras personnes, Celles de leurs Cemmes, de leurs Enfants, leurs Maisons, leurs Meubles et effets, leurs Esclaves au pouvoir del Ennemi, n'auront que deus partis à prendre: Le premier Servit de laisser derriere lus Cequils ont deplus Cher, pour aller demander dupain aux habitans de la Campagne, dont ils auqmenteroient la détresse ainsy que celledes troupes. Le Second et leliui qu'ils prendroient Selon toates les apparences, Seroit de se soumettre au Vainqueur, d'appuijer et de repandre ses manifestes, de Coucourivr de toutes leurs forces pour. engager les habitans de la Campagne à acceptev les Conditions avantageures qui leur seroient offertes, et à porter au Capla production de leurs terres. Les Campagnardt lies d'amitié, de parenté, d'interêts avee les habitans de la ville, Seroient portés à les Soulager, et vu motif bien puivant pour lesy determiner, C'est la Certitude d'être payés en argent Comptant. Comment Quinze ou Dix huit Cent hommes de Troepes, pourroient Eller empecher Cette Communication. La Cote Seule qui s'etend depuis la Baije de Saldagne jusqu'a la Riviere Saléé Seroit malgardéé par Cing ou six mille hommes. Il fandroit encore gardee tous les d'ébouchés qui conduisent dans l'‛int= érieur des terres et les Paijes de Falset de Houte, Qu onjette les yeus suola Carle du Pais, et quon juge S'il est possible de bloquer vue Si vaste êtendréé avec Dix huit Cens hommes de Troupes eparpilles par petits Corps à plusieurs lieues les vues des Aatres. Empa= =chera t'ou les chaloupes et autres embareations de l'Ennemi d'aborder dans les differents points de la Eote, et d'y recevoir les vivres que les habitans leurporteront. Quon considere, d'ailleurs l'état de Ces Troupes dis perséés par pelotons à de grandes distances, fatiquéees de Que Seroit ce, Si l' Ennenu etoit Maitre dela Ville? laisseroient ils leurs habitations, leurs femmes, leurs Enfants a la merci des Noirs, pour Camper dans des plaines arides; non pour chasserl rumensi du Cap, Mais pour ajouter à la détresse et à la misere de leurs parents et amis restés dans la Ville ? Mais Cafin en supposant que Ces habitans S'obstinassent à nepas foumue des virres à la ville, malgré les lieus du Sang, del'anitié et, leplus puissant appas, de l'argent; En supposant qu'oubliant le soin de leurs familles et de leurs Possessions ils restattent avec les Troupes, dans vne position à porteé de laville, qu'en resulteroit il? reprendroient ils le Cap. Hon Certainement, La d'éfense en sera bien plus faule pourl runemi qu'elle nel 'êtoit pour nous, Il suffii pour s'en convaincre dejetter les yeus suile Plan; en Verra que Mous Sommes obligés de veiller sur quantité de points et de diviser nos forces en consequence. Les Ennemis Maitres dela Rade, n'ontrieu à crainre du Coté de la Daije de Van Camps, ni depuis la Baije de van Cames jus qu'a la Maison de Locéte, ni depuis Cetle maison jus qu'au Cimetiere, ni depuis le Cimetiere jusquan Chateau, ni Cufiu depuis le Chateau jusquan Fort LaKnogue, Ils peuvent done porter toutes leurs forces vers la droite. Saus crainte d'êtte tournés par leurs flanes, sans Crainte de diversion oude fausse attacque. Cequi pourroit nous Una beaucoux compté surla Cavalerie dela Campagne, et je couviens que tant quon aband ovmnera pas la ville, elle pourroit rendre quelque Service: lependant Out doit se rappeller que les Cavaliers, ayant tlé rassembles au Cap en Suillet 1781. lors de l'Eutreé de l'Escadre Anglaise à la Baije de Salvagne, ils ont temoiqné laplus vive iuxatience de retourner chez cus, et le plus grand Mombre a quitté le Cap malgré les Ordres Contraires. sistance precaire qu'il fandra arracher à des habitands interessés: Cufin les Colons peu accoutunnés aus horreurs dela Guerre, chercheront a y mettre vnterne en se joignant à l'Ennemi pour se défaire des Troupes qui loin de leur etre dela moindre utilité, leur Seront à Marches et de Veilles continuelles et reduites à vno sub= Charge et odieuses,
English
The happiest thing that could happen would undoubtedly be to force the Enemy to re-embark, but he would do so only after having put all our Artillery out of service, destroyed our Batteries and our munitions, razed the Castle, emptied and then demolished the Company's Storehouses, and after having carried off the most precious effects of the inhabitants, burned the Bridge and all the vessels belonging to the Port Service. The Damage would be very considerable; however, if the Cape remained ours, it would not be without remedy; but it is very difficult to believe that the English, Masters of the Town of the Cape, would resolve to abandon so precious a Conquest. We have observed that they would have arrived with three Months of provisions and that they would find more in the Town; nothing will prevent them from sending to fetch some at the Bay of Ste. Augustin. They know well that the constancy of the Colonists has an end, and that there is no Example of a Colony that has sacrificed all its wealth and devoted itself to misery out of attachment to the Mother Country, or to the Company upon which it depends. It would be strangely self-blinding to expect such devotion from the inhabitants of the Cape after the dispositions that have been made known. If therefore the capture of the town of the Cape entails the loss of the Colony, as We believe we have demonstrated, we must think very seriously about its defense and its preservation: In truth, many difficulties present themselves, but they are not insurmountable; by adding New precautions to Those already taken, by employing Our time and our resources usefully, one may hope without temerity to confound the plans of the enemy. In treating the defense of the Cape, We will Begin with the right because It is from the right that We must expect the Enemy, whether he disembarks to the North of the Bay, whether he disembarks at the Salt River; or whether, having disembarked at False Bay or at Hout Bay, he sets out on the march to attack the Town. The line that had been proposed to be drawn from the Charlotte Battery as far as the House of Munnik would shorten our defense a little, but It left exposed the New Battery, the Intermediate Battery, Fort Knokke, the Tulbagh Battery; all of these points serve to keep the Disembarkation at a distance and need to be protected. The line drawn from Fort Knokke as far as the House of Munnick is not without defects, but It will become very respectable as soon as the Season will allow Major Gilquin, who has put the left part of this line in a Good State, to repair and improve the part on the right. The position of this line was determined by the necessity of Covering and protecting the Batteries which extend from Fort Knokke as far as the Town, and which are destined to bombard the roadstead and to make staying there inconvenient and dangerous for the Enemy: It would be appropriate to raze the small Houses which Mask the Left of this line; it is true that the right of this line is dominated by the ridge of Devil's Peak; But all Those who have traversed this ridge know How much time and effort it would Cost to drag and establish there even a few light field pieces. These pieces would soon be dismounted by the new Battery that Mr. Gilquin has just Constructed; This Battery commands the ridge, and the cannonballs hitting a ground absolutely bristling with rocks and stones will make the Establishment of the enemy Batteries almost impossible. One can still improve and garrison the Battery. The line proposed by the French Engineers cannot be turned on the right and closes the town; One will see on the Plan that this line is much longer than the One that was already made, and that because of the rocky quality of the ground, it would require two years to complete it; It has, moreover, the defect of Not protecting the Tulbagh, Charlotte, Helene, and Other batteries; seeing that its fires are too plunging, and cannot prevent the Enemy from disembarking at the Salt River, taking these Batteries in flank and reaching, by favor of the sunken roads that are behind the Old lines, up to the foot of the Castle: he might even reach it by favor of the Old lines which would Cover him without undergoing the least danger.
Dutch transcription
328 arriver deplus heureus Seroit Sans doute, de forcer l'Ennemi à se rembarquer, mais il ne le feroit quaprés avoir mis toule notre Artillerie, hois de service, detrait Nos Batteries, et nos munitirons, rasé le Chateau, vundé et ensuite abattu les Magazins dela Compagnie, quapres avoir emporté les effets les plus precicus des habitants, buelé le Pout et toutes les embarcations appartenantes au Service du Port. le Dommage Servit tres consi= =dérable; Cependant, si le Eap nous restoit, il ne Seroit pas sans remede; mais il est bien difficile de croire, que les Anglais Maitres de la Villedu Cap, Je resolussent à abandonner une Conquete aussi preusense. Nous avous observé qu'ils servient arrivés avec trois Mois de virres et qu'ils en brouveroient encore dansla Ville; nieu ne les empechera d'en envoyer prendre à la Baije de Str Augustin. Ils savent bien que la Constance des Colons a vnterme, et qu'il ny a pas d'Exemple d'une Colonie quiait Sacrifie toutes ses richenes et se soit voué à la misere, par attachement pour la Mettopole, ou pour la Compaginie dout elledexend. Ce Seroit s'avengler etrangement qued' attendre vu parcil devouement des habitans du Cap apres les Dis positions quon Si done la prise de la ville du Cax entraine la perte dela Colonie, Comme Ou Croit l'avoir demontré, il saut Songes bres Serieusement à Sa deffente et à sa Conservation: Il se presente à la verité bien des difficullés, mais Elles nee out pas insurmontables; en ajontant de Nouvelles precautions à Celles deja prises, en Employant ultilement Notre tems et stos ressources, on peut. espérer sans temeité de de concerter les projels del in En braitant de la defense du Cap, Mons Commencerons pav la droité parceque C'est pavla dioite que Mous de vons attendre l'Ennemi, soit qu'il debarque au Nord dela Baije, Soit qu'il debarque à la Riviere Saléé; soit quayant debarque à Fals baije oua la Hout-Taije, il se leue Connoit. =neui. Mette en marche pour attaquev la Ville. La liqne quon avoit proporé de tirer de puis la Patterie Charlotte jusqu'à la Maison de Muniek racouraroit vn peu notre defense, mais Elle laissoit à deconvert la Pattezie Neewe, la Batterie intermediaire, le Fort La Knoque, la atterie de Tulbagh; tous les La lique tirée depuis le Fort La Kenoque jus= qua la Maison de Munnick, n'est pas Sans defauit, mais Elle deviendra tres respectable Pitot quela Saison permettra à Mr: Le Major Gilquin qui a mis lapartie, gauche de Cette lique dans vn Ton Etat, de reparer et ameliores la partie dee a droite. La position de Cotte lique acté d'eterminéé parla nécessité de Couvrir et de proteger les Batteries qui s'etendent depuis le Fort la kenoque jusqu'a la Ville, et qui sont destinéés à battre larade et à en rendre le sejour incommode et dangerens pouol Eunernu: Il Seroit à propos de raseo les pelites Maisons qui Masquent la Gauche de Cette ligne, il est vraiquela droite de Cette liqne est dominéé par l'arréte de la Montagne du Diable; Mais tous Ceus qui ont parcourn Cet arréte savent Combien de tems et depeines il en Couteroit poue y trainer et établie même quelques pieces de Campagne legeres. Ces pieces Seroient bientot de montéés par la nouvelle @ atterie que M:r De Gilquin vient de Construre, Cette Batterie Commn= =aude l'arréte, et, les boulets enportant sur onterrein absolument herissé de roches et de pierres, rendront l'Etablissement des Tatteries ennemies presque niepossible, Supent encore perfectionier et garnie la Batterie La liqne proposéé par MeMl. les Ingenieurs francois, nepent être tournéé pavla droite et ferme la ville; On verra suvle Plan que Cette liqne est beaucoup plus lonque que Celle qui étoit deja faite, et qu'acaure dela qualité du terrei pierrens, il faudroit deus aus pourl' achever, Elle a d'ailleurs le d'efaas de Nexas protéger les le atteries de Tulbagh, Charlotte Relene et Autres; attenduque ses feus sont trop plongeants, et ne peevent empecher l'Eimemi de de barquer à la Riviere Salée, de prendre ces Batt= =eries en flane et de parvenie à la faveur des Chemius Creus qui sont devriere les Vicilles lignes jusqu'acepied du Chateau: il pourroit meme y parvenir a la faveuodes Viceilles lignes qui le Concuroient Pans essuyer le moindredangev. points servent à eloiqnevle Debarquement et ont besoin d'être protegés.
English
929. constructed by Mr. Larcher above the house of Munnik: this battery commands Rooije bloem and enfilades the gorge through which one might seek to turn our lines. This post still preserves for us the possibility of communicating with the interior of the country, and we will be able to send reinforcements to it through the gorge that leads from the house of Munnik to the post. I think that if, in accordance with the opinion of Colonel de Gordon, a good redoubt were built at Rooije bloem with a powder magazine and one for provisions, a shed or blindages to house the troops, and if this solidly fortified redoubt were given a garrison of two hundred and fifty men, the enemy would be forced to besiege it. And as the cannons of the line and those of the new battery make the investment of this redoubt impracticable, it would be possible for us to communicate with it, to relieve the garrison, and to prolong the defense long enough to exhaust the first efforts of an army which, after a voyage of four months, after eight or ten days of a grueling siege under a changeable climate, would not be long in being decimated by disease. Meanwhile, for this initial defense, we would have exposed only the seventh or eighth part of our forces; the remainder would still be in reserve behind our lines. These lines are certainly not impregnable, but the enemy, being obliged to attack them from afar, is exposed for a long time to the fire of our artillery. This attack may be compared to an open assault on a covered way, with a difference, however, that is in our favor. Ordinarily, the covered way is attacked only by debouching from the last parallel in order to have less ground to cover; and after the superior artillery of the besiegers, enveloping the attacked front, has extinguished or at least largely silenced the fires of the outworks, and those of the body of the place. Due to the nature of the terrain and the lack of resources, the enemy will not be able to advance toward our lines by means of saps and parallels, nor batter us with an artillery more numerous than that which we can oppose to him. The disposition of our troops destined to defend these lines is hidden from the enemy, which must be counted as a great advantage. If these lines were breached, the troops would find a respectable position by resting their right on the battery of Devil's Peak and directing their left toward the castle. However defective this fortress may be, it will overawe the enemy because of the new works that Major Gilquin has constructed there, the water reservoir that he is arranging to fill the ditch of the faussebraye which he has revetted anew, and which is wide enough not to be filled up by the rubble of the wall; finally, because the attacker, beaten from the front by the fire of the castle, will also have his left flank dominated by the battery of Devil's Peak and threatened by the troops that will have retired there. Thus the enemy, before making himself master of the castle and the town, will have been obliged to carry out at least three successful attacks: namely, that of the redoubt of Rooybloom, that of the lines extending from Fort Knokke to the house of Munnik, and finally that of the castle. If an absolutely necessary precaution has been taken, which will not have escaped the wisdom of the Governor—that of removing every kind of conveyance, horses, cattle, flocks, grain, wine, and other provisions; if a part of the cavalry placed beyond the Salt River with Hottentots and a detachment of regular troops has continually harassed the enemy and disrupted his communication, a communication moreover often interrupted by the inconstancy of the winds; if our defense against each of these attacks has been passable—it will require great forces for the enemy to make himself master of the Cape, unless he has succeeded in the attacks with his squadron.
Dutch transcription
929. construte par Mr. Larcher audessus de la Maison de Munik: Cette Batterie Voit Rooije bloem et en file la gorge, pavla quelle on cherche xoit à tourner nos lignes. Ce Poste nous Conserve encore la possibilité de Commeniquer avee l'Interieur du pais et Mous pourons y envoyer des renforts pac la Gorge qui conduit de la Maison de Munnik à le poste. Je peuse que, si d'apres l'avis de Mr. Le Colonel de Gordon, on Consruisvit à Rooije bloem vne bonne redonte avecou Magazin à pondre et in pour les vivres, on hangard ou blindages pour loger les troupes, quondonnat à Cette redonte Solidement fortifice vne garnison de deux cents Cinquante hommes, On obligeroit l'Enneeni a l'assieger, et Comme les Canons de la lique et ceus de la Batterie neuve rendent l'investissement de Cette redoate impraticable, il Nous Seroit possible de Communiquer avec Elle, de renour eller la Gar= nison et de faire durer la defense assez longtems, pour exuisee les premiers Efforts d'vne arméé qui, apres vne traversée de Lutatre mois, aprés huit ou dis jours d'un Siege faligant, sous un Climat vari= -able, ne tarderoit pas a être duminée pavles Maladies: Cependant, Nous n'aurions exposé pour Cette premiere defense que la Septieme ou huitieme partie de Not forces; le reste Seroit enore en réserve derisere Nos liques. Ces liques ne sont pas surement imprenables, Mais l'Enneni étant obligé de les attaquer de loin, est exposé pendant longtems au seu de Notre Artillerie: Cette attacque pent être comparéé à vne attacque de chemin couvert, devive force, avee vue differeme, lependant, qui est en Notre faveur. pour l' ordinaire on attacque le chemin Convert qu'en debouchant de la derniere parallele pour avoir moins d'Espace à parcourir; et aprés que l'Artillerie Superieure des Assiegeans embrassant le front attaqué, a éteint oudunoins fait taice en grande partie les Feus des Ouvrages Exteiens, Linsy l'Ennemi avant de le rendre Maitre du Chateau et de la ville, aura élé obligé de faire aumoin trois attacques heureuses: Savoir, Celle dela Redoute de Rooybloom, Celle des liqnes qui sétendent depuis le Fort Lakenoque jusqu'â la Mais onde Munnike, Cnfin Celledu Chateau. Si ona pris vne precaution absolument necessaire qui n'aura pasechappé à la Pagesse du Gouverneur, Celle d'eloignee toute es pece de Charroi, de Cheveaux, Bestiaus, troupeaus, de bled, devin et autres provisions; Si vne partie de la Cavalerie placéé audela dela Riviere Salée avec des hottentots et un Détachement de troupes regléés, a harcelé Cont= inuellement l'Ennemi et gené sa Commenication Communication dailleurs souvent interrompréé pai l'inconstance des Vents, si notre d'efense contre Macunede Ces Attaques a êté passable, il fandra de grandes forces à l'‛Ennemi pour se rendre Maitre die Cap, amoins qu'il nait reussi dans les attacques avee Son Escadre lerrain et le défaut de ressources, l'Ennemi nexourra pas cheminer vers nos liques pardes boiaus et des Paralelles, ni nous battre avee vue artillerée plus Nombreuse que Celle que nous pourons lui opposer, la dis position de Mos Troupes destinces à deffendre ces liques est cachéé à l'Ennemi, Cequi doit être Compte pour vu grand Avantage, Si Ces liqnes êtoient fouées, Les troupes trouveroient vreposition respectable en appuiant leue droite à la Basterie de la Montague du Diable et dirigeant leur gauche Vers le chateau, telle défectueure quee oit Cette forteresse, Elle en imposera à l'Ennemi a cause des Ouvrages nouveaux quij afait Mr: Le Major Gilquin, de la retenue des laus quil meuage pour remplii le fossé de la faure braije qu'il a revelu à neuf, et qui est assez. large, pour nepas être combléé pavles décombres de la muraille; Enfin, parceque l'attacquant battu de front, pavle feude le Chateau, aura encore son Plauc gauche dominé par la batterie de la montagne du Diable et menaie pavles Troup as qui Sly Serour et ceus du Corps de la Place, parla qualité du retirees.
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930 which he will have attempted against our center, our left, and our rear. By the center, I mean the space included on the sea side from the Four à Chaux which terminates the old entrenchments, up to the cemeteries. Landing there is difficult, not only because of the reefs, but because of the crossfires that sweep this space; it is not, however, impracticable, and if the enemy, through multiplied feints, had succeeded in deceiving us and penetrating into the town, the fate of the Cape would be decided. Landing is also very difficult on the side of the left, that is to say, from the cemeteries up to the Societé house, but it is not generally impossible either: it is the same with the left as with the center. If the left were forced, the Cape would be taken. It would therefore be necessary to improve the entrenchments that extend from the Lion's Rump to the cemeteries, place cannon in the angle of the first cemetery, complete the flèche marked on the plan, and make a good epaulement with ditch and palisades from the cemetery to the Boucherie. If the shore, being too narrow, does not allow this epaulement to be pushed further than the house of the Port Captain, it would be necessary to compensate for it by constructing strong traverses to close the three streets which, on that side, lead to the shore, and by placing another epaulement from the Boucherie up to the two small white houses that face the ravelin of the castle, unless one preferred to give this epaulement a direction toward the salient angle of the same ravelin. These epaulements and traverses will shelter the troops, unfortunately dispersed over a very considerable space, from a first coup de main, and will give them the possibility of resisting until they receive reinforcements. I am so convinced of the necessity of providing without delay for the safety of the left and the center, that I regard the town as exposed to being taken in very few days, and the colony as lost if one does not attend to it very seriously. It is not doubtful that the Company, convinced more than ever of the importance of the Cape, will subsequently adopt a more solid system of fortification to ensure its preservation. One of the first concerns of the officer charged with the execution will likely be to give the artillery its full effect by leveling the ground to a great distance and by filling in the sunken paths that lead from the Salt River to the town. These paths are as many trenches under cover of which the enemy will be sheltered from the fire of the batteries; but the Cape having been threatened for two years, having been liable to attack from one day to the next, it would have been dangerous to destroy what was already done in order to begin a work that requires several years before being finished. One was therefore obliged to limit oneself to taking advantage of the works that existed, and adding new ones to them in order to put oneself in a state of defense as soon as possible. These works are far from being complete and from having done all that there is to do. Our position is not, in truth, inexpugnable; it would even be very bad in Europe. But let one consider that we will have to deal with an enemy who, after a four or five months' crossing, will land on a beach where he will find no resource in carts, magazines, and that, from the moment of his landing, he will experience a variable climate, continual fatigues; that he will be able to draw his provisions and his munitions of war only from his squadron; that his communication with this squadron will be very often interrupted; that, being reduced to attacking us behind our lines, he will be exposed for a long time to the fire of a numerous artillery before reaching the palisades; that behind these lines, he will find fresh troops, formed and ready to receive him. If he arrives during the summer, the ground is so hard that it will take him much time and trouble to make the slightest entrenchment; if he arrives during the winter, the inclemency of this unhealthy season will melt his army away. Each day will diminish
Dutch transcription
930 quil aura tentées contre notre Centre, notre gauche et nos derrieres. Par le Centre, ; Entends l'Espace compris du Cöté de la Mer depuis le Fouvachaus qui termine les Vieus retranchemens, jusqu'aus Cimetieres. Le De barquement y est difficile, Non seulement àc ause des eceuils, mais à Caure des feus croisés qui battent Cet espace: il n'est pas lependant, impraticable et Si l'Ennemi pardes feintes multiplices avoit reuss à Nous donner le Changeet à pénêtrer dans la ville, le sort du Cap Soroit decide. Le Debarquement est auni ties difficile du Coté dela gauche, Cest a dire, de puis les Cimetteres jusqua la maisonde Societé, mais il n'êst pas non= =vlus genéralement impossible: il en est dela gauche comme du Centre. Si la gauché étoit forcée, le Cap Seroit pris, il l'audroit done amelivrer les retranchemens qui s'etendent de pris la Croupe du Lion jus quan Cimetieres, placer du Canon dans l'angle du premier. Cimetieze, achever la Cleche marquee daus leslan, et faire vu bon éxaulement avee fossé et palissades de puir le Cimetiere jusqua la Boucherie. Sile rivage trop étroit ne permet pas de poussee cet Exaulement plus loin quela Maison de M. le Capitaine de Port, il faudroit y supleer en construisans de foites traverses pour fermer les trois rues qui, de ce Coté la aboutinent au Rivage et en mee ters on autre Exaclarens depuins la Boucherie pus quaus deus vetiles Maisons blanches qui sont vis à vis le ravelin du Chateaue, amoiis quon n'anne mieus donner à Cet Epaulement une Direction Vers l'angle Saillant du ieme ravelin Ces Epaulemens et traverses mettrons les troupes disporsées malheureusement dans vne Espace tres Considerable, à l'abri d'on premier Coup de main et laue donneront la Possibilité de resistey jus qua Cequelles recoivent du Nenfort. ce uis teltement persuade de la necessité de pourvoir sans delai a la sureté de la Ganche, et du Centre, quaje regarde la ville Comme exporeé a être prise en ties peu dejours, et la Colonie comme verdue si ou nee en occupe pas ties Sericeusement. Iluêst pas doukeus quela Compagnie convaincce plus que jamais del'importante du Cap n'adopte par la Suite mn Sistéme de Fortification plus solide pour en assuree la Conservation. Une des prémieres attentions del offier chargé del' Execution Sera vraisemblablement de Donner à l'artillerie tout son Effer en applanivant le tevrein à vne grande distanie et en Comblant les chemins creus qui conduisent de la Riviere Salée à la ville. Ces chemins sout autant de tranchées a la favene des quels l'Cincemi Sera à l'abri du fendes Batterées, mais le Cap aijant été menacé pendant doux ans, aiant pu être attacque d'vnjou à l'autre il ent élé dangereus de détruire Cequi etoit deja fait, pour Commencee vn travail quient dem= -ande plusieurs annéés avant d'être acheré, Ma done êté obligé de se borner à tirer parti des Ouvrages qui éaistoient, et d'En ajdulee de Nouveaux pour se mettre en Etat de d'éffeme leplictot possible. Il s' en faut de beaucoux que Ces Ouvrages soient Complets et quon ait fait tout cequ'il y a a faire. More position n'est pas à la Verité ruex puynable, Elle seroit même tres maivaise en Curope. Mais quon Jonge que nous aurous a faire à vn Ennemi qui, apres quatre ou Cing Mois de traverseé de barquera suome plage ou il ne trouvera aucune ressource ett Charrois, Magazius, et que, des le moment de son Debarquement il éprou= vera un climat variable, des fatiques Continuelles, quilne pourra tiree ses virres et sas minitions de querre quedeeon Eocadre, quee a Comminitation avee Cette Escadre Sera tres souvent interromprie, qu'étant reduit a Nous attacquer devriere nos liques, il sera lougtems exposé aufeu d'ne Artillerie nombreuse avant de parvenir jus quans palissades, que derriere ces liques, il trouvera des troupes fraiches, Sornées et pietes a le recevoir. S'il arrive pendant l'êté, le terruin est si dur quil lui sandra beaucoup de temset de peines pour faire le moindre retranchement: S'il arrive pendant l'hyver, l'intemperie de Cette Saison mal= =saine fondrason armée. Chaque jour diminuera
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No. 7 Monsieur The Baron de his forces, and each day our troops, and even our inhabitants, will gain strength. These considerations, without permitting us to be negligent, are calculated to reassure us, especially if, for our provisions, our munitions, and our hospitals, we have taken all the precautions that prudence indicates. Although some persist in the opinion that the Cape must not be abandoned until the very last resources have been exhausted, one can perceive that once the lines are breached, the troops, by resting their right flank on the New Battery of Devil's Peak and taking possession of the small plateau that commands it, have retained the ease of penetrating into the country along the mountains without the enemy being able to prevent them, because in a war of skirmishes, whoever occupies the heights always has the advantage. It is true that artillery could not be dragged along; this is what Colonel Gordon foresaw when he voted to establish a reserve of field pieces and munitions of war at Stellenbos or at Tigueberg. Once the town is taken, we would not be reduced to retreating into the country if there were a sufficient quantity of munitions and provisions between Lion's Head and Table Mountain. This position, indicated last year and since approved by the French engineers, would be unassailable if it were well supplied. The troops could await reinforcements there for several months, and in the meantime cause the enemy continuous anxieties. It is undoubtedly better to retreat than to lay down arms, but the troops must not resolve upon retreat until there is absolutely no other choice left to take. If we were forced to retreat for lack of having taken the precautions within our power for our provisions, however vigorous the defense might otherwise have been, there would always be reproaches leveled against us. At the Cape, June 1, 1783. 1. The retreat toward the aforesaid gorge can probably only take place if the enemy forms their point of attack solely against our right; for if we were attacked at the same time on the left, and our troops were breached or cut off by the enemy there, I believe it would be extremely difficult for them to retreat toward the gorge in the presence of a victorious enemy, along narrow roads or continuous defiles; and if they... As this question is a consequence of the system of defense adopted by majority vote—to enclose ourselves within entrenchments and concentrate our forces—I believe that, following the spirit of this system, we have nothing more advantageous nor more honorable to do than to defend our ground foot by foot, and to profit from all the advantages it can offer us. In that sense, the post in the gorge of the aforesaid mountains seems to me inherently very strong, and could, in the event that we were attacked only on our right, serve as our redoubt or last refuge. However, as this system of defense offers nothing victorious, is in my opinion subject to great drawbacks, and must naturally end by rendering the garrison, or at least the greater part of it, prisoners of war, I have taken the liberty of making the following observations, which I believe may serve to demonstrate what I have just put forward. Finding myself tasked, as are the other members of this Council of War, with giving my opinion on the further defense of this Colony, and principally whether the post established in the gorge between Table Mountain and Lion's Head ought to serve as our last retreat in the event that a superior enemy, after having forced us in our advanced entrenchments, should compel us to abandon the Fort and the batteries that are now being constructed at the foot of Devil's Peak. Sir, Plettenberg, Governor and Director of The Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (Signed) Couwaij etc., etc., etc.
Dutch transcription
N. 7 Monsieur Le Baron de Ses forces et chaquejour aquerira nos troupes et même Nos habitans, Ces Considerations, sans nous permettre de negligence, sont faites pour nous rassurer, surtout, Si pour nes Virres, Nos Munitions, Nos hopitaus, Nous avous pris toutes les précautions quelax rudence indique. Suviquon persiste dans l'opinion qu'il ne faut quittar le Cap qu'apres avoir exuisé les derineres ressources, on peut l'appercevour qu'apres les liques, foriées, les troupes en appuiant leur droite à la Nouvelle Batere de la Montague du Diable, et en semparant du petit plateau qui la domine, ont Conservé la Sacelité de peuetrer dans le paijs, le long des Mont= =agnes, saus quel Ennemi put lesen empecher, pareeque dans vne Guerre de Chicane, Celui quiscupe les hauteurs a toujours l'avantage: il est vrai quon Nexouroit pas ytrainee du Canon, C'est ceque Mbr: Le Colonel Gordon a prevu lorsqu'ilaopiné pour deposer a Stellenbos ou a Tigueberq vne reserve de pieces de Canopagne et de munitions de querre. La ville prise, on ne servit pas reduit à entrer dans le Paijs S'il y avoit vue quantité suffisante de minitions et de virres entre la Elte du lion et la montagne de la Cable: Cette position indiquéé l'aunéé deruiere et approuvéé deprus par MeMl. las Ingenieurs francois Seroit in attacquable Si elle étois bien pourvie. Les troupes pouroient y attendredes Renforts pendant plusieurs mois, et pendant le tens donner al Einemi des inquietaedes Continuelles. Il vant mieux sans doute se retire quede mettre bas les armes, mais les troupes ne doivent se determinee au parti de la retraite que quand il n'en restera absolemneert plus d'autre a prendre. Si Mouscitions forces a Mous retirer faute d'avoir pris pour nos Subsistances les pre= =cautions qui sont en notre pouvoir, telle vigoureure quait cte d'ailleurs la d'éfense, on auroit toujours des reproches a nous faire. Au Cap le 1e Juniy 1783. 1e La retraite versla gorge susdite nepent probablement avoir lieu, que quand les Ennemis formeront uniquement leur point d'attacque a notre droite; Cao si nous êtions en même tems attaques pavla Gauche et que noo troupes y sussent forcées, ou coupées paol' Ennemi, je crois qu'il leu Seroit dela derniere difficulté de se retirer alors vers la gorge, en présence d'on Ennemi- Victorieus, par des Chemins étroits oudes defiles continuels: et si Elles se Comme Cette question est uue Consequence du Sistéme de défense que l'on a adopté à la pluralité des voix, de nous enfermer par des retranchemens et de concentrev nos forces, Je crois qu'en suivant l'Esprit de Ce Sistéme, nous. n'avons rien de plus avantageus ni de plus honorable a faire, quede defendre notre terrain pied à pied, et de profiler de tous les avantages qu'il peut nous officr: et daus le sens leposte dans la Gorge des Montaques sus dittes, me parait par sa nature tres fort, et pourroit, au Cas que nous ne fussions attaqué's que par notre droite, nous servio de reduit ou de dernier refuge Mais comme ce Sisteme de défense n'offre rien de Victorieus, qu'il esta mon avis Sujet a de grands inconveniens et qu'il doit naturellement finir par rendre la Garnison, dumoins laplus grande partie prisonniere de Guerre; jai pris la liberté de faire les Observations Suivantes, qui, je crois, pourront servie de demonstration à leque je viens d'Avancer. Me trouvant chargé, de même que les Autres membres de Ce Conseil de Guerre de dire mon sentiment sur la défense ulterieure de cette Colonie, et principalement Si leposte etabli dans la gorge, entre la Montagne de Table et la lête du Lion, doit nous servio de derniere retraite; au Cas qu'in Ennemi Supérieur, apres nous avoi forcé dans nos retranche mens avances, nous obligeat d'abandonner le Fort et les Batteries que l'on Construt maintenant au pied de la Montagne du Diable Monsieur Plettenberg Gouverneur et Directeur de La Colonie du Cap de Bonne Esperance (Signe) Couwaij =etc: etc: etc:
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first retreated toward the Citadel to make use of it as a second entrenchment, it would subsequently become increasingly difficult for them to withdraw toward the Gorge, and the enemy, being by then masters of the town, would doubtless soon seize the batteries we are constructing at the foot of Devil's Mountain by taking them from the rear. Then the position of our troops defending the new entrenchments on the right would become very critical, and if, acting in concert with those who happen to be in the Fort at that time, they do not risk a vigorous action but instead fall back upon the Citadel, this will facilitate the junction of the enemy troops from both attacks. Thereby we would find ourselves invested and besieged in that small fortress, which can hold at most only six hundred men, and the enemy, master of all the avenues leading to the Gorge, would subsequently render our retreat toward that post completely impossible. Thus, in the event that the enemy succeeds in his attack on our left, retreat toward the Gorge cannot plausibly take place. 2. But suppose that the attack were made on our right only, and that after as vigorous a defense as possible in our lines and the Citadel, we had retreated into the Gorge with the firm resolve to await there the relief that might reach us from Europe or the Isle de France, we would require a quantity of war munitions and provisions more considerable than the circumstances in which we would then find ourselves could allow us; not to mention that water and wood, which we would continually need, would be very difficult articles for us to procure, all the more so since it is hardly likely that our slaves would wish to share our fate to the very end; especially if, by remaining faithful to us, they ran the risk of perishing from misery. 3. And if this retreat were made in winter, the inclemency of the weather and all the hardships of that season would plausibly suffice to make the majority of the troops who had remained faithful to their colors fall ill in less than 15 days; for it is believed that desertion there would be considerable. 4. As one cannot suppose that a prudent enemy who wished during our winter months to attempt the conquest of this colony would come with his fleet to anchor in Table Bay, where the slightest storm would expose him to total ruin, all the less so since he can with the greatest safety make his landing in False Bay and Hout Bay without having anything to fear from our cannon or from the winds prevailing in this season, it is more than probable that, having the requisite knowledge of our climate and 6. But suppose that our courage and firmness enabled us to endure all the hardships inseparable from a reasonably long stay in this Gorge, our forces would melt away visibly, both through disease and desertion, while those of the enemy would increase in the same proportion; thus our position would hardly be threatening to him, and although we were sheltered from his attacks, is it to be presumed, if he merely takes the ordinary precautions, that we could deal him any blows of any significance? For to claim that we could drive him back out of the town All those who know by experience the difficulty of the narrow paths leading from this Gorge to Hout Bay will be forced to admit that they are passable only for very nimble men carrying nothing but their weapons; for if they also had to carry war munitions and provisions, they would succumb under their load, and as the width of the aforesaid paths permits marching only in single file for 3 to 4 leagues of road, wishing to move cannon, caissons, or other wagons through there would be attempting the impossible. Thus a handful of men would suffice to stop us in these defiles, or to destroy us entirely when we arrived completely exhausted by fatigue at their outlets. 5. Our situation would then be not only very critical, but most frightful, since the very hope of being able to save ourselves by retreat will be taken from us, while we will continually have before our eyes an immense country where it would have been easy for us to subsist and cut off the enemy's supplies. Now, suppose that the enemy, having overcome all the difficulties we could have opposed to him, has forced us to retreat into the Gorge, the knowledge he has of the terrain will doubtless dictate to him that, with very few men, he can occupy the narrow and extremely difficult paths leading across Table Mountain and behind this mountain to Hout Bay to stop those who might wish to escape that way; consequently his detached posts could suffice for this purpose, and if they did not suffice, his victorious position would give him the facility to reinforce them as much as he deemed proper; of the terrain (which one cannot reasonably deny him), he would then choose, in order not to leave his entire expedition to chance, these safe places, and that to maintain secure communication with his fleet, he would establish a few detached posts in Hout Bay and on the road from Muysenburg to the capital. 932
Dutch transcription
retiroient dab ord vers la Citadelle pour en profiter comme d'un secomd retranchement, il leur deviendrait dans la Suite deplus en plus difficile de se retirer vers la Gorge, et les Ennemis étant pourlors Maitres dela Ville, sempareroient Sans doute bientot des l atteries que nous Construsons au vied de la Montagne du Diable, en les prestant par leurs revers. Alors laposition de nos Troupes qui defendent les nouveaus retranchemens de la droite, deviendrait. trés cuitique et si de concert avec Celles qui se trouveront pour lors dans le Fort, Elles ne risquent pas une action de viqueur, mais qu'elles se replient Surla Citadelle, Cela faulitera la jouction des Troupes Enmemies des dens attaques, pavla nous nous trouverions investis et assieges dans lette petite forterene qui nexent tout auplus contenu que six Cens hommes, et l'Ennemi Maitre de toutes les avenues qui menent a la Gorge, nous rendrait dans la suite la retraite vers ceposte tout afait impossible: Rinsy au Cas que l'Ennemi reussit dans son attaque a notre gauche, la retraite versla Gorge ne pent vrais emblablement avoir lieu. 2e Mais supposeque l'attacque se fit a notre Droite Seulement, et qu'aprés une Défense aussi vigoureuse que possible dans nos lignes et la Citadelle, Nous nous fussions retires dans la Gorge, avec la ferme resolution dy attendre le secours qui pourroit nous arriver d'Europe oude l'Isle de France, il nous y f'audroit vue quantité de munitions de Guerre, et de bouche plus considerall queles Circonstances ou nous nous trouverions alors ne pourroient nousle es mettre; Sans compter que l'Cauet le Pois, dont nous Aurious continuellement besoin, seroient pour nous des Articles bies difficales a acquerio, d'autant plus quil nest queries apparent que not Esclaves voulussent courir jusqu'alafin la même fortime que nous; Surtous, si en nous demeurant fideles, ils courroient ris que de periv de misere. 3o Et Si Cette retraite se faisoit en Ryver, l'intemperie de l'air, et toutes les incommodités de cette saison suffvrioient vraisemblablement pour faire tomber malades en moins de 15. jours, laplupart des Trouppes qui seroient demeurees fideles a leurs Drapeaus; Car on eroit que la désertion y seroit consideritl 21e Comme On nepent pas supposer qu‛on Ennemi prudent qui vondroit pendant nos mois d' hijver tentevla Conquete de Cette Colonie, viendra avece a flotte mouiller dans la Baije dela Table, ou la moindre tempete l'exposeroit à vue ruine totale, d'autant moins qu'il peut avec lap lus grande securite faire son De barquement dans la Baije Fals et la Hout-Baije Jans avi rien à appréhender de notre Canon ni des vents qui requens danis Cette Saison, I est plus que probable qu'ayant les Connoisances requises de Hotie Climat et 6e. - Mais Supposé que notre Courage et notre fermeté nous missent en Etat d'endurer toutes les incommodités inseparables d'un Sejour raisonnablement long dans Cette Gorge, nos forces y fondraient a vil d'oeil, tans pavles maladies que paula désertion, pendant que Celles de l'Ennemi augmenteroiens dans la même proportion; dinsy notre Position ne seroit querre menacante pourlii, et quoique Housy Jussions a l'abri deses attaques, Est il à presumer, s'il prend seulement les precautions ordinaires que nous lui puissions porter quelques Coups tant soit peu Jous Ceus qui connoissent par Experieme la difficulté des Sentiers etroits qui menent de Cette Gorge a la Hout=Baye, seront contraints d'avouer, qu'ils ne Sout praticables que pour des hommes tres ingambes, qui n'ont rien a poiter que leurs arimes: Cav S'ils devoient encore porter des munitions de guerre et de bouche, ils Succomberoient sous leur charge, et Comme la largeur des sentiers susdits nepermet que de marcher vu à vn pendant 3 a. 4. Lieues de chemin; vouloir mener par-la du Canon, des Caissons, ou d'autres Voitures, ce seroit tenter l Impossible Done vue poignee de monde suffirait pour nous arréter dans ces défilés, ou pour Nous d'etruire entierement quand Nous serions arrivés tout harassés de fatigue 5e: Notre Sitaation Seroit nonseulement tres critique alors, mais des plus affreures puis que l'Espérance même de pouvour nous Sauver pavla retruite nous sera otéé, pendant que nous aurons continueellement devant les yeus vut pais immense ou il nous ent été facile de Subsister et de cuper les virres a l‛Ennemi. Or supposé que l'Enniemi, apres avoir vaincu toutes les difficultés que nous aurons pu lui opposer, nous ait forcé a nous retirer dans la Gorge, la Connoinanae qu'il a du local lui dietera Sans doute, qu'avec fort pai de Monde, il pent occuper les sentiers etrotts et extremmentt difficiles qui menent pavla Montagne dela Table, et derriere cette montagne à la Rout Baije pour arreter ceus qui voudroient s'echapper par la: parconsequent ses postes détachés pourroient liu suffire à Cette fin et S'ils ne lui suffisoient pas, Sa position victorieure lui donnerait la failité deles renforcer autant qu'il le jugeroit â propos: du Local (Clequon nepent pas rais onnablement lui refuser:) il chris eroit alors, pour nepas donner toute son Expodition au hazard, ces endroits sars et que pour conserver la Communication assuréé avec sa flotte, il êt abliroit dans la Hout-Baye et suole Chemin de Muysenburg à la Capitale, quelques postes detachés. impoitans. Cav pour voulois dire que Mous pourrions le rechasser de la ville à leurs débouchés. 932